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Agathon Fric*  Popping the Question:  What the Questionnaire
 for Federal Judicial Appointments Reveals about
 the Pursuit of Justice, Diversity, and the 
 Commitment to Transparency
Since 2017, the Canadian government has published excerpts from questionnaires 
that prospective judges completed as part of the judicial selection process, subjecting 
newly appointed superior and federal court judges to a degree of scrutiny that is 
unprecedented in Canadian history. Using this novel source material, this article 
explores what a sample of 16 judges’ questionnaires do and do not say about the 
individuals behind the robes. This review suggests that those appointed to the bench 
in 2017 generally demonstrate insight into the judicial role in Canada. However, 
some provide only super cial responses, others parrot back normative values 
that the government has already prescribed, and many offer substantially similar 
answers. This suggests,  rst, that not all successful applications or, for that matter, 
applicants are created equal and, second, that applicants use the questionnaire less 
as an opportunity to demonstrate free thought and more as a test to prove their 
fealty to dominant assumptions about the court’s role in society. The questionnaire 
therefore misses an opportunity to show that diversity on the bench is more than 
skin-deep. Meanwhile, recent trends show that the government has lagged behind 
on its commitment to make judges’ applications public. The article concludes that if 
the government is serious about introducing greater transparency and accountability 
to the judicial selection process, then it should revise the questionnaire to elicit more 
meaningful responses from applicants and table legislation to codify the government’s 
political promise to publish appointees’ views on the role of the judiciary in Canadian 
society.
Depuis 2017, le gouvernement canadien publie des extraits des questionnaires 
remplis par les juges potentiels dans le cadre du processus de sélection judiciaire, 
soumettant ainsi les juges des cours supérieures et fédérales nouvellement nommés 
à un degré d’examen sans précédent dans l’histoire du Canada. En utilisant ce 
nouveau matériel de base, le présent article explore ce qu’un échantillon de 16 
questionnaires de juges disent et ne disent pas à propos des individus portant la 
toge. Cet examen suggère que les personnes nommées à la magistrature en 2017 
font généralement preuve d’une bonne connaissance du rôle judiciaire au Canada. 
Cependant, certains ne donnent que des réponses super cielles, d’autres reprennent 
les valeurs normatives que le gouvernement a déjà prescrites, et beaucoup offrent 
des réponses substantiellement similaires. Cela suggère, premièrement, que toutes 
les candidatures retenues ou, d’ailleurs, les candidats eux-mêmes ne sont pas créés 
égaux et, deuxièmement, que les candidats utilisent le questionnaire moins comme 
une occasion de démontrer leur libre pensée et plus comme un test pour prouver 
leur  délité aux hypothèses dominantes sur le rôle de la cour dans la société. Le 
questionnaire manque donc une occasion de montrer que la diversité sur le banc 
est plus que super cielle. Entre-temps, les tendances récentes montrent que le 
gouvernement a pris du retard dans son engagement à rendre publiques les requêtes 
des juges. L’article conclut que si le gouvernement souhaite sérieusement introduire 
plus de transparence et de responsabilité dans le processus de sélection des juges, 
il devrait alors réviser le questionnaire pour obtenir des réponses plus signi catives 
de la part des candidats et déposer un projet de loi pour codi er la promesse 
politique du gouvernement de publier les opinions des personnes nommées sur le 
rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la société canadienne.
* B.A. Hons. (Carleton), J.D. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Harvard). Agathon is a lawyer in Calgary. He 
thanks the justices of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta for inspiring him to pursue this project, 
Investigator Normand Sirois of the Of ce of the Information Commissioner of Canada for guiding 
him through the Access to Information process, Oren Tamir for offering constructive feedback and 
constant reassurance, and Professor Mark Tushnet, whose supervision was invaluable to this project.
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Introduction
I. Scope and methodology
II. The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments
1. The rules were made to be broken
2. Judicial federalism invites cross-province comparisons
3. It pays to be humble (but it pays more to know your audience)
4. How law and justice develop: practice, principle, and 
recognition
5. Diversity is good (and vague)
6. A reasonable apprehension of “bees”?
III. On transparency and priorities
Recommendations and conclusion
Introduction
On 27 April 2007, Kristine Eidsvik reached what might be described as 
the pinnacle of her career. Eidsvik, then a no-nonsense litigator in her late 
forties, had made a career out of being “ rst”—the  rst woman to become 
an associate at the law  rm founded by former Alberta premier John 
Brownlee and, later, the  rst woman to become a partner at a prominent 
Calgary  rm.1 On this day, Eidsvik became the Government of Canada’s 
latest appointee to Alberta’s superior trial court, the Court of Queen’s 
Bench.2 Five months earlier, the newly christened Harper government 
had implemented reforms to the regional Judicial Advisory Committees 
that, since 1988, have been responsible for evaluating applications and 
recommending nominees for federally appointed courts to the Minister of 
Justice. Most notably, after November 2006, Committees could no longer 
“highly recommend” candidates, as had been the practice in previous 
decades; instead, they could only “recommend” or “not recommend” a 
candidate, raising questions about whether this would permit ideology to 
eclipse merit in the Minister’s  nal analysis.3
1. Lerina Koornhof, “Alumni Pro le: The Honourable Kristine Eidsvik” University of Alberta 
(5 April 2017), online: <web.archive.org/web/20170425080757/https://www.ualberta.ca/law/news/
main-news/2017/april/the-honourable-kristine-eidsvik> [perma.cc/MK59-Y6TL].
2. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Alberta Judicial Appointments Announced” 
(27 April 2007), online: <webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20071116045906/http://canada.
justice.gc.ca/en/news/ja/2007/doc_32008.html> [perma.cc/DWH2-45GS].
3. Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under the Harper 
Government” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 43 at 56. See also Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, 
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In 2018, eleven years after her appointment, Justice Eidsvik was still 
making news, but for all the wrong reasons. Eidsvik was describing one 
of her experiences conducting a judicial dispute resolution4 to a classroom 
of law students when she admitted that she felt uncomfortable being in a 
room “full of big dark people.” She reportedly said she “was used to being 
in her ‘ivory tower’ where [she is] normally ‘removed from the riff raff.’” 5
Within 24 hours, she had apologized to the students, saying she “felt sick” 
by what she had said and that “as soon as it came out of [her] mouth, [she] 
recognized [the comments were] not appropriate and could be construed 
as insensitive to racial minorities.”6 To her credit, Eidsvik completed a 
course on cultural competence on her own initiative and, in April 2018, the 
body tasked with disciplining judicial misconduct, the Canadian Judicial 
Council, dismissed four complaints against her, concluding that “this 
[was] an isolated incident and it is not necessary to take further action.” 7
Justice Eidsvik might have been joking, but her “ivory tower” 
metaphor is an apt depiction of superior courts across Canada, whose 
judges are overwhelmingly old, white men. If federally appointed judges 
were characters in Guess Who?—the children’s board game in which 
players ask each other yes-or-no questions to whittle down a  eld of 
possible suspects—then one would be hard-pressed to  nd many physical 
features to distinguish between them. Is your judge black? Guess again. 
From 2009 to 2012, 98 out of the 100 judges appointed by the federal 
government were white. The remaining two were Métis.8 Is your judge 
a woman? Probably not.9 In 2014, then-Justice Minister Peter MacKay 
“Minister Toews Pleased to Announce Changes to Judicial Advisory Committees” (10 November 
2006), online:  <www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/11/minister-toews-pleased-announce-
changes-judicial-advisory-committees.html> [perma.cc/82Y4-723M].
4. Judicial dispute resolution is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that can be binding or 
non-binding. It offers litigants a chance to have their dispute resolved by a sitting judge in a closed 
boardroom without the trappings of an ordinary trial and strict rules of evidence. 
5. Meghan Grant & Lucie Edwardson, “Calgary judge apologizes to law students for comments 




7. Canadian Judicial Council, News Release, “Canadian Judicial Council completes its review of 
complaints against the Honourable Kristine Eidsvik” (10 April 2018), online: <cjc-ccm.ca/en/news/
canadian-judicial-council-completes-its-review-complaints-against-honourable-kristine-eidsvik> 
[perma.cc/XYY4-3L5M].
8. Kirk Makin, “Of 100 new federally appointed judges 98 are white, Globe  nds,” The Globe 
and Mail (17 April 2012), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/of-100-new-federally-
appointed-judges-98-are-white-globe- nds/article4101504> [perma.cc/N3MX-2HL6].
9. From 2007 to 2017, 64 per cent of all federal judicial appointees were male: Of ce of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Judges Appointed between 2007 and 2017, by 
gender (27 October 2017), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/AppointedByGender-
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explained that women “aren’t applying” because they would rather stay at 
home with their children than travel the judicial circuit.10 His comments 
were roundly criticized.11 Does your justice have white hair? Most likely. 
As applicants need to have practised law for at least ten years to be eligible 
for appointment, 12 most judges are late in their careers by the time they 
join the bench. In addition, one in four federally appointed judges have 
elected supernumerary status, a kind of semi-retirement, which means 
they are between 65 and 75 years old. 13 The total number of judges over 
65 is even higher, as not all will have accumulated the requisite years of 
service to be eligible for supernumerary status and not all would elect that 
status, even if they could do so.
In this way, Justice Eidsvik is something of a contradiction. On 
one hand, she is among the minority of federally appointed judges who 
are women. On the other hand, her “injudicious”14 comments bear the 
unmistakable mark of a person who belongs to the dominant social group. 
As one student noted, “what was shocking was the ease at which [her 
comment] came…it was almost like she was ignorant to the fact it was 
offensive.”15 Without a record of her application to become a judge or the 
reasons for her selection, it is impossible to say whether the government 
would have appointed Justice Eidsvik but for its changes to the selection 
process in 2006. But one thing is clear: her comments demonstrate the 
harm that can occur when judges do not or, by virtue of their privilege, 
cannot empathize with the communities they serve.
eng.html> [perma.cc/36L9-UETW].
10. Tonda MacCharles, “Peter MacKay tries to explain lack of diversity on federal courts,” The 
Toronto Star (18 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/06/18/peter_mackay_
tries_to_explain_lack_of_diversity_on_federal_courts.html> [perma.cc/FFV5-JD2J].
11. See e.g. Tonda MacCharles, “Lawyer disputes Peter MacKay’s claim that women, visible 
minorities don’t apply to be judges,” The Toronto Star (19 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/
news/canada/2014/06/19/lawyer_disputes_peter_mackays_claim_that_women_visible_minorities_
dont_apply_to_be_judges.html> [perma.cc/E25C-TSY8]; Breese Davies, “Lack of women, minority 
judges not due to baby-making,” The Toronto Star (24 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2014/06/24/lack_of_women_minority_judges_not_due_to_babymaking.html> [perma.
cc/8T2M-CBMH].
12. See Of ce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Guidelines for Judicial 
Advisory Committee Members (October 2016) at Appendix A, online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-
nominations/committees-comites/guidelines-lignes-eng.html> [perma.cc/8HGR-ZWKR] [JAC 
Guidelines].
13. See Of ce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Number of Federally 
Appointed Judges in Canada (3 September 2019), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/
judges-juges-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/RV9W-F5E9]. For supernumerary status eligibility, see Canadian 
Superior Courts Judges Association, Supernumerary and Retired Judges, online: <www.cscja.ca/
about-us/constitution/supernumerary-and-retired-judges> [perma.cc/6LUG-95DN].
14. Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 7.
15. Grant & Edwardson, supra note 5.
Popping the Question:  What the Questionnaire for 163
Federal Judicial Appointments Reveals…
Fortunately, there are signs of improvement. In 2015, Justin Trudeau’s 
Liberals successfully campaigned on a New Plan for a Strong Middle 
Class, including a platform to promote “Fair and Open Government.” 
That meant, among other things, a pledge to “make the Supreme Court 
appointment process more transparent”16 and to “build a government as 
diverse as Canada” by adopting “a new government-wide appointment 
process that is open and based on merit.”17 This new ethos would extend 
beyond the top court to all federal judicial appointees, including judges of 
the Federal Court and the superior courts of the provinces. As Trudeau’s 
theory went, “[o]ur country is stronger, and our government more effective, 
when decision-makers re ect Canada’s diversity.”18
This logic is a common refrain among judicial selection reformers. 
Although the ways in which judges are chosen vary around the world, 
many agree that a diverse bench is preferable to a homogenous one.19 But 
in what sense(s) is Canada diverse and how can or should governments 
seek to replicate this diversity among their ranks, if at all? If diversity in the 
judiciary means racial diversity, as it often does, then one might argue that 
diversity is inessential to a well-functioning justice system—that, beyond 
playing some vague representative function, it is little more than window 
dressing on the cold application of law. Indeed, some reject the notion that 
courts can or should play a representative role at all, representation being 
a function traditionally reserved for legislatures.20
However, whether or not one believes that courts have a moral or 
institutional obligation to visibly re ect the communities that they serve, 
16. Liberal Party of Canada, “Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (2015) at 30, 
online (pdf): <www.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf> 
[perma.cc/A43H-E529].
17. Ibid at 34.
18. Ibid.
19. For a Canadian perspective, see Samreen Beg & Lorne Sossin, “Diversity, Transparency and 
Inclusion in Canada’s Judiciary” in Graham Gee & Erika Rackley, eds, Debating Judicial Appointments 
in an Age of Diversity (London: Routledge, 2017) at 118-141. For a view from across the pond, see 
Lady Hale of Richmond, “How Diverse Are Judges?” in Jeremy Cooper, ed, Being a Judge in the 
Modern World (New York: Oxford UP, 2017) 183 at 184-185. Baroness Hale of Richmond, President 
of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the  rst woman appointed to that court, offers four 
rationales for increasing diversity on the bench: boost the judiciary’s democratic legitimacy, manifest 
the equality that courts purport to uphold, avoid wasting talent, and achieve a difference in outcomes.
20. See e.g. Sophie Turenne, “Fair Re ection of Society in Judicial Systems” in Sophie Turenne, 
ed, Fair Re ection of Society in Judicial Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Heidelberg: Springer 
International, 2015) at 1. Turenne argues that speaking of a court’s “representativeness” con icts with 
notions of judicial independence and impartiality. Turenne prefers to speak of racial diversity on the 
bench as only one among many possible procedural and institutional reforms designed to enhance the 
court’s re ection of society, which is an independently worthy goal. Cf Lorne Sossin, “Should Canada 
Have a Representative Supreme Court?” in Nadia Verrelli, ed, The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming 
Canada’s Supreme Court (Toronto: McGill–Queen’s UP, 2013) at 27.
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there are also pragmatic reasons to do so. First, as natural scientists 
have recognized, that which is more diverse tends to be more resilient 
and, to that extent, more sustainable.21 The same may be said of social 
institutions, including courts, whose legitimacy depends not only on the 
constitution, but also on the public’s con dence in them and on respect 
for the rule of law. These latter conditions are strongest when people feel 
that the justice system is of, for, and by them. In 2020, in a country as 
diverse as Canada, where 22.3 per cent of citizens are visible minorities,22
a predominantly “male, pale, and frail”23 judiciary simply will not do. 
Second, there is “growing empirical evidence” that judges from diverse 
groups judge differently, sometimes producing substantively different—
and, diversity advocates would argue, better—outcomes than their white, 
male colleagues.24 
Yet, quite apart from challenging whether the Trudeau government’s 
faith in diversity is preferable to its alternative, there is the question of 
whether and how states can meaningfully achieve diversity among their 
courts. Recent changes in Canada’s judicial appointments process offer a 
unique case study to evaluate the extent to which this avowed commitment 
to diversity is manifested in the opinions and personality traits of 
recent appointees. On 20 October 2016, the Minister of Justice, Jody 
Wilson-Raybould, announced a new process to “increase the openness, 
transparency, accountability, and diversity of Canada’s judiciary.”25 The 
Minister made three notable changes, all targeting the Judicial Advisory 
Committees. Wilson-Raybould “reconstituted committees [to] better 
re ect the diversity of our great country[;] revised committee mandates 
to increase the independence of their processes; and [adopted] an 
open selection process for the three members of each committee who 
represent the general public….”26 In short, the government had undone 
21. See e.g. Paul Leslie & J Terrence McCabe, “Response Diversity and Resilience in Social-
Ecological Systems” (2013) 54:2 Current Anthropology 114. 
22. See Statistics Canada, Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity Highlight Tables (Census 
Program Data Products, 2016), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-
fst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=41&Geo=00&SP=1&vismin=2&age=1&sex=1> [perma.cc/SB7J-
AGA2].
23. I owe this phrase to a 2007 Carleton University lecture delivered by Peter Grif ths, who was then 
Associate Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice.
24. Rosemary Hunter, “More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making” 
(2015) 68 Curr Legal Probs 119 at 124, 129.
25. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial 
appointments and reforms the appointments process to increase openness and transparency” (20 
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the controversial changes ushered in by the Harper government in 2006: 
gone was the police representative on the committee, back was the “highly 
recommended” category, and new was the emphasis on selecting women 
and visible minorities for the committees in the hope that their own 
diversity would trickle down to their non-binding recommendations for 
judicial appointment.27 
A fourth change escaped mainstream attention: after October 2016, 
certain parts of a successful application for federal judicial appointment 
would be released to the public. 28 Since then, the government has published 
excerpts from questionnaires that prospective judges completed as part 
of the selection process, subjecting newly appointed superior and federal 
court judges to a degree of scrutiny that is unprecedented in Canadian 
history. As the Department of Justice describes it, “[t]he questionnaires 
are used by the Judicial Advisory Committees across Canada to review 
candidates and submit a list of ‘highly recommended’ and ‘recommended’ 
candidates for consideration by the Minister of Justice. Candidates are 
advised that part of their questionnaire could be made available to the 
public, should they be appointed to the bench.”29 So far, the government 
has released data from Parts 5, 6, 7, and 11 of the questionnaire, which 
cover a judge’s language, education, work history, and views on the role 
of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system, respectively. By 31 December 
2017, the government had appointed 89 judges whose applications it has 
published or has promised to publish “shortly.”30 This number includes 
appointments in each of the ten provinces, as well as appointments to the 
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal. It excludes prothonotaries; 
nominees to the Supreme Court of Canada, who follow a distinct selection 
27. A January 2017 press release announcing that the government had reconstituted Judicial 
Advisory Committees in several provinces emphasized that women made up “a strong majority of 
the new JACs and minority groups have unprecedented representation”: Canada, Department of 
Justice, News Release, “Minister of Justice announces Judicial Advisory Committee appointments” 
(19 January 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/01/minister-justice-
announces-judicial-advisory-committee-appointments.html> [perma.cc/EV42-YWU5].
28. Canada, Department of Justice, Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments (4 August 
2017), online (pdf): <www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/forms-formulaires/cq-qc/pdf/
Questionnaire-for-Federal-Judicial-Appointments-Aug-04-2017.pdf> [perma.cc/5CLZ-UEL9] 
[Questionnaire].
29. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice David M. Paciocco’s 
Questionnaire (7 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/04/
the_honourable_justicedavidmpacioccosquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/878C-8225] [Paciocco’s 
Questionnaire].
30. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial 
appointment in the province of Quebec” (19 December 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-
justice/news/2017/12/government_of_canadaannouncesjudicialappointmentintheprovinceofq.html> 
[perma.cc/AQZ2-7EB2].
166 The Dalhousie Law Journal
process; deputy judges to the territories; and judges who already held 
federal judicial of ce when they were elevated to the Court of Appeal, 
reallocated to the superior court in their province, or promoted to Chief 
Justice.31 Table 1 shows the distribution of federally appointed judges in 
the  rst year after the Minister’s reforms took effect. 
Table 1: Federal Judicial Appointments by Jurisdiction
from 20 October 2016 to 31 December 2017 32
Jurisdiction Number of  rst-time federal judicial 
appointees







Newfoundland and Labrador 5
Nova Scotia 3





Of the government’s 89 appointments made under the new process 
in 2017, 16 have questionnaires that are presently available to the public, 
as listed in Table 2. This study uses the information in Part 11 of these 
questionnaires to produce a qualitative analysis of judges’ views on the 
role of the judiciary, operating on the premise that there is public value in 
getting to know the people behind the decisions that help to regulate our 
lives. Who we empower to settle disputes among us tells us something 
about who we are as a society. And to the extent that these answers represent 
31. There is one exception: see footnote in Appendix A.
32. See Appendix A for a full list of appointees by date, name, and jurisdiction. The Minister 
announced the new process in 2016, but she did not appoint anyone under it until 2017.
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their authors’ actual opinions, they become self-ful lling prophecies 
after an applicant’s appointment to the bench. Thus, studying judges’ job 
applications offers a rare window into these decision-makers’ psyches.
Table 2: Judges appointed by the Federal Government in 2017 whose 
questionnaires are publicly accessible as of 1 January 2020 
(by date of appointment)
Date Jurisdiction Appointee Court Level
3/9 PEI Clements, Tracey L. (Q.C.) Trial
3/24 AB deWit, William T. (Q.C.) Trial
3/24 AB Hollins, Michele H. (Q.C.) Trial
3/24 AB Khullar, Ritu (Q.C.) Trial
3/24 AB Slawinsky, The Honourable Marilyn Trial
3/24 QC Moore, Benoît Trial
4/7 ON Paciocco, The Honourable David M. Appellate
4/7 ON Swartz, Deborah Trial
4/12 BC Mayer, Andrew Phillip Avtar Trial
4/12 ON Bell, Robyn M. Ryan Trial
4/12 ON Nakatsuru, The Honourable Shaun S. Trial
5/12 BC Riley, W. Paul (Q.C.) Trial
6/14 BC Milman, Warren B. Trial
6/23 BC Brundrett, Michael J. Trial
6/23 Federal Pentney, William F. Trial
6/23 ON Gomery, Sally A. Trial
One could argue this is a useless endeavour that reads too much 
into judges’ answers, which cannot be understood apart from the 
practical requirements for which they were created. 33 In other words, the 
questionnaires might say more about what applicants think the government 
wants to hear—what they think will get them appointed—than what the 
33. See Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane & 
Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2010) at 939.
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applicants themselves believe. Their content could be described as either 
style or substance. But if it is all style, then one might ask what the 
government expects to achieve by publishing judges’ responses, why the 
government would ask questions that elicit super cial answers or, if the 
questions are serious, then why the government would appoint people who 
do not demonstrate substantial insight into the role of Canadian courts. In 
each of these cases, public con dence in the judicial branch of government 
is undermined. On the other hand, if the content of these questionnaires 
is substantive, then they represent a cache of information that might tell 
Canadians something about their judiciary that is troubling or reassuring. 
In view of the Judicial Advisory Committees’ secrecy, the only way to 
know is to dissect the answers that the committees themselves relied upon 
in making their recommendations for appointment.
An initial review of the available questionnaires suggests that many 
of their authors do demonstrate insight into the judicial role in Canada. 
However, some provide only super cial responses, others parrot back 
normative values that the government has already prescribed, and many 
offer substantially similar answers. This suggests,  rst, that not all successful 
applications or, for that matter, applicants are created equal and, second, 
that applicants use the questionnaire less as a platform to demonstrate free 
thought and more as a test to prove their fealty to traditional assumptions 
about the court’s role in society. This is not surprising in view of the 
judiciary’s history as a primarily reactive and conservative institution,34
but it means that the questions miss an opportunity to show that diversity 
on the bench runs deeper than the eye can see. Thus, the questionnaire 
should be revised to elicit more meaningful responses from prospective 
appointees if the government is serious about its commitment to greater 
transparency and accountability in the appointment of federal and superior 
court judges. 
I. Scope and methodology
This article is about whether judges’ applications convey “a deep 
understanding of the judicial role in Canada,” as the government suggests 
they should.35 It is not about the visible elements of diversity, except to the 
extent that they implicate or suggest differences in the way judges view 
the role of the judiciary. The goal is not to tally the number of women 
34. This is a function of the court’s after-the-fact adjudication of disputes and the common-law 
principle of stare decisis, which preserves the status quo and fosters restraint. See e.g. Stephen R 
Perry, “Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law” (1987) 7:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 215 at 
248.
35. See Questionnaire, supra note 28, Part 11.
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or to count the number of ethnicities represented on the bench.36 Instead, 
this study considers the degree to which judges appointed by the Liberal 
government in 2017 exhibit philosophical or ideological diversity. It does 
this by looking at a sample of 16 judges’ answers to two of six questions 
on the role of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system contained in Part 
11 of the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments. Therefore, 
the completed questionnaires of these seven women and nine men  gure 
prominently in the analysis.
This study is exploratory, inductive, and qualitative. It is not meant 
to be exhaustive or to unearth every trend one might derive from these 
questionnaires, which are data-rich and dif cult to assimilate. Rather than 
measure the frequency with which certain concepts arise in the text of 
judicial applications, which would have limited utility in a sample this size, 
this project seeks to build an understanding of the range of answers judges 
have given by observing the presence or absence of certain substantive 
themes and stylistic devices to arrive at conclusions about what is true of the 
sample, even if it is not 100 per cent representative of the larger population 
that the Liberal government has appointed to federal and superior courts 
in Canada.37 In doing so, the hope is that this reveals something about how 
these particular judges relate to notions of justice and interact with the 
Judicial Advisory Committees that evaluate their applications. The point is 
not to suggest that the competence and abilities of judges are static, or that 
an application is the only or best way to predict a candidate’s likelihood 
of a long, successful, and in uential tenure on the bench. However, the 
Questionnaire is one of the primary tools the government uses to gauge 
an applicant’s suitability for the judicial role and, in that sense, it is no 
trivial matter. The intention is to start the discussion about the value and 
possible consequences of publishing judges’ applications—not to preempt 
it. In addition, this project is limited insofar as there could be errors in 
the government’s publication of the data that skews or misrepresents 
what judges intended when they answered the questionnaire. As written 
media, the questionnaires do not enable the reader to seek clari cation 
36.  This work, which is important in its own right, is starting to be done by the Of ce of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Since 2017, it has published statistics on the number 
of judicial applicants and appointees who self-identify as members of various gender, racial, 
Indigenous, disability, linguistic, and sexual minority groups: see Of ce of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Statistics regarding Judicial Applicants and Appointees (October 
21, 2016–October 27, 2017), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/StatisticsCandidate-
StatistiquesCandidat-2017-eng.html> [perma.cc/YR8F-FJ4T].
37. Webley, supra note 33 at 927. Nor can this essay’s observations generalize to all 1,216 federally 
appointed judges in of ce as of 3 September 2019: see Number of Federally Appointed Judges in 
Canada, supra note 13.
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or elaboration, as the Judicial Advisory Committees who screened the 
applications might have done38 and, in any event, such follow-up could be 
construed as violating an applicant’s ethical duty to avoid commenting on 
issues that he may come to adjudicate now that he is in of ce. 39 
Part II begins by exploring what the questionnaires do or do not suggest 
about the judges that the government has appointed. Part III introduces 
an important caveat on the government’s commitment to transparency—
namely, the signi cant turnaround time to release judges’ applications to 
the public after their appointments. That section asks and then answers 
what might explain the delay and what this means for the government’s 
reform agenda. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting ways that the 
Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments could be improved.
II. The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments
Lawyers and judges who are interested in becoming a federal or superior 
court judge apply by downloading an application form styled the 
“Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments” from the Of ce of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs’ website. The Questionnaire, 
which was last revised on 27 October 2017, is available in English and 
French. It instructs candidates on how to complete the application and 
where to mail it. The 25-page Questionnaire is divided into 12 parts.40 Part 
11, titled “The Role of the Judiciary in Canada’s Legal System,” states:
The Government of Canada seeks to appoint judges with a deep 
understanding of the judicial role in Canada. In order to provide a more 
complete basis for evaluation, candidates are asked to offer their insight 
into broader issues concerning the judiciary and Canada’s legal system. 
38. The Questionnaire is a big part of the application, but it is not the only or even the most important 
part. Along with the Questionnaire, applicants must submit a background check consent form, a form 
authorizing one’s provincial law society to release information to the government, and  ve legal 
writing samples. As noteworthy as what the written part of the application contains is what it does 
not. For instance, the Questionnaire discloses that the “Judicial Advisory Committee consults widely, 
both within and outside the sources provided in this Questionnaire, and in making enquiries will make 
every effort to maintain con dentiality” [emphasis added]. Thus, the Questionnaire is only the tip of 
the iceberg of what a Judicial Advisory Committee may consider in evaluating a candidate’s  t for the 
judicial role. Judicial Advisory Committees are known to solicit information directly from references 
listed in Part 3, including opposing counsel and sitting judges, to develop a more candid assessment of 
the applicant’s credentials: see JAC Guidelines, supra note 12.
39. See e.g. Of ce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Ethical, Change of 
Lifestyle and Other Considerations” in Guide for Candidates, online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-
nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html> [perma.cc/U9XB-JJ6R].
40. These cover different personal information about one’s demographics, language pro ciency, 
legal and non-legal work experience, education, awards, community involvement, notable cases, 
publications, presentations, character issues, disciplinary history, and health: see Questionnaire, supra 
note 28.
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For each of the following questions, please provide answers of between 
750 and 1000 words.
1. What would you regard as your most signi cant contribution to the 
law and the pursuit of justice in Canada?
2. How has your experience provided you with insight into the variety 
and diversity of Canadians and their unique perspectives?
3. Describe the appropriate role of a judge in a constitutional 
democracy.
4. Who is the audience for the decisions rendered by the court(s) to 
which you are applying?
5. Please describe the personal qualities, professional skills and 
abilities, and life experience that you believe will equip you for the 
role of a judge.
6. Given the goal of ensuring that Canadians are able to look at the 
justices appointed to the bench and see their faces and life experiences 
re ected there, you may, if you choose, provide information about 
yourself that you feel would assist in this objective.41
In keeping with this article’s exploratory purpose, it focuses on Questions 
1 and 2, making only general references to Questions 3 to 6. Before turning 
to examine the substance of applicants’ answers, it is worth making a few 
general observations, given the novelty of the source material.
1. The rules were made to be broken
First, answers to Part 11 are sometimes as notable for what they do not 
say as for what they do. For example, although the government requested 
that candidates provide answers of between 750 and 1000 words each, the 
applicants in this study often ignored that instruction altogether. As Table 3 
shows, only 36 of the 80 answers studied (45 per cent) fell within or above 
the speci ed word range. More than half (55 per cent) of all answers fell 
below the required response length. All but two of the 16 questionnaires 
studied had one or more answers that fell below the required 750-word 
minimum. Question 4 on the audience for judicial decisions was the most 
under-answered (11 answers below range), followed by Questions 2 and 
3 on diversity and the appropriate role of a judge, respectively (9 answers 
each), Question 1 on one’s contributions to the law (8 answers), and 
Question 5 on the applicant’s personal qualities (7 answers). On average, 
respondents wrote the least about a court’s audience and the most about 
their personal qualities, professional skills, and abilities. 
41. Ibid at 19-24 [emphasis in original].
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Table 3:  Word Counts of Appointees’ Answers to Questions in Part 11 of the 
Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments42
PART 11 – QUESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDICIARY IN CANADA’S LEGAL SYSTEM
APPOINTEE 
(IN ORDER OF 
APPOINTMENT)
1 2 3 4 5 6†
Tracey L. Clements, Q.C. 304 206 123 79 476 163
William T. deWit, Q.C. 690 582 904 880 794 222
Michele H. Hollins, Q.C. 568 536 355 236 407 350
Ritu Khullar, Q.C. 759 519 447 338 616 620
The Hon. Marilyn Slawinsky 783 722 517 871 936 375
Benoît Moore 836 801 819 748 918 368
The Hon. David M. Paciocco 1171 827 1013 1136 1078 314
Deborah Swartz 767 856 539 183 635 557
Andrew Phillip Avtar Mayer 737 673 666 707 926 352
Robyn M. Ryan Bell 821 799 734 735 742 136
The Hon. Shaun S. Nakatsuru 621 611 610 668 601 665
W. Paul Riley, Q.C. 502 387 774 725 1066 89
Warren B. Milman 836 815 913 767 948 -
Michael J. Brundrett 702 754 895 796 819 11
William F. Pentney 382 519 772 457 997 379
Sally A. Gomery 871 823 749 524 713 583
MEAN AVERAGE 709 652 677 616 792 324
†OPTIONAL  IN RANGE  ABOVE RANGE  BELOW RANGE
Signi cantly, Part 11 is the only part of the Questionnaire with a 
speci ed word range. It was open to the government to place no limits 
on length or to specify only an upper limit, as is often the case with 
standard forms. That it chose not to, combined with the form’s signal 
that the government “seeks to appoint judges with a deep understanding 
of the judicial role in Canada,” implies that the length of an applicant’s 
response was meant to be treated as a proxy for the depth of his or her 
answer. That assumption might not always be accurate, but neither is it 
42. All word counts are from the English-language version of the questionnaires except for Quebec 
appointee Benoît Moore, whose numbers are from the French questionnaire: see Canada, Department 
of Justice, The Honourable Justice Benoît Moore’s Questionnaire (31 March 2017), online: <www.
canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_justicebenoitmooresquestionnaire.
html> [perma.cc/X76N-TWTZ] [Moore’s Questionnaire]. It is possible that these word counts re ect 
abridged versions of the applicant’s answers; however, one may assume they are the original answers, 
as the published questionnaires do not indicate that they have been revised. Still, some editing has 
probably occurred because it is unlikely all the applicants drafted their answers as bulleted points, 
which is how they appear online.
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unreasonable. For example, Justice Clements used her  rst chance to show 
the government that she has a deep understanding of the appropriate role 
of a judge in a constitutional democracy by providing the shortest, and 
most glib, of all the answers to Question 3:
I have chosen to provide a somewhat “philosophical” answer. There is a 
strong argument to be made that a judge in a constitutional democracy is 
the legal and moral compass of society. This is a heavy, heavy burden. A 
judge really is both the gatekeeper and the caretaker of a constitutional 
democracy. He or she is the paramount “check and balance” in our 
system. The eight [sic] and burden of those roles is not lost to me. I [sic] 
does seem to me that our system really must constantly strive to strike the 
balance of upholding and respective [sic] the rule of law (which forms 
the very foundation of our system and our society) but also recognizing 
the many, many challenges and obstacles that many face.43
Contrast her 123-word answer with a small excerpt from Justice Riley’s 
longer, 774-word response to the same question: 
In a constitutional democracy, democratically elected legislatures have 
the mandate and authority to enact legislation for the bene t of their 
constituents, but only within the limits set out in the constitution. The 
role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy is to uphold and 
enforce these constitutional limits. In other words, judges are called 
upon to ensure that legislation and executive actions of the government 
do not exceed the limits set out in the constitution. Two particular areas 
in which courts are most commonly required to perform this function are 
(i) by adjudicating upon the division of legislative powers between the 
federal and provincial governments (“Division of Powers”), and (ii) by 
protecting and enforcing individual rights under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). 
[…] 44
In fewer words, this excerpt from Justice Riley’s answer manages to touch 
upon three dimensions of Canada’s judiciary that Justice Clements’ does 
not—at least not explicitly: the court’s role in reviewing legislation for 
compliance with the constitution, the possibility for con ict between 
federal and provincial laws, and the superiority of individual rights vis-à-
vis Parliament. 
43. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Tracey L. Clements’ Questionnaire 
(9 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicetraceylclementsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/599C-PP8K].
44. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable W. Paul Riley’s Questionnaire (1 
November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
wpaulrileysquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/BNX6-VSBC] [Riley’s Questionnaire].
174 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The point of this exercise is not to suggest that Justice Clements’ 
answer is normatively wrong and Justice Riley’s is correct. Nor is it to 
criticize Justice Clements as a person, to imply that she could not be a fair 
and impartial arbiter, or to suggest that Justice Riley knows something that 
she does not. However, it is fair to say that, in relative terms, her answer 
is not as sophisticated as Justice Riley’s and, in absolute terms, her answer 
is de cient because it fell below the requested word range, while his did 
not. In most spheres, including the law, concision is an underrated virtue, 
but a concise answer is not necessarily a complete one. Question 3 alone, 
which implicates normative theories of constitutionalism, democracy, and 
institutional design, could justi ably be the subject of a 3,000-word essay. 
If the purpose of the Questionnaire is to demonstrate a deep understanding, 
then surely completeness at the risk of verbosity is preferable to brevity at 
the risk of appearing ignorant. 
This observation has three implications. First, given that most 
applicants fail to answer consistently within the speci ed word range, it is 
questionable whether those applicants demonstrate a deep understanding of 
the subject matter. Second, one might doubt the suitability of an applicant 
for judicial of ce who disregards formal rules as basic as “provide answers 
of between 750 and 1000 words.” If they cannot or will not do that before 
their appointment, then what rules will they not follow or what reasons 
will they not disclose when they make decisions on the bench? Third, if 
Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister are willing to overlook this 
indiscretion, as they have shown by appointing judges who provide less 
than full answers, then how much value do they ascribe to these questions 
and their answers? Clearly, short, super cial answers are no bar to judicial 
appointment. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the minimum word requirement 
is unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst. For example, 
Justice Slawinsky’s application is eloquent, thoughtful, and thorough in 
well under 750 words:
The appropriate role of a judge in a constitutional democracy is a complex 
and multifaceted one. It is complex because the role contains a core of 
important responsibilities that include resolving disputes, interpreting 
and enforcing the law, and upholding and ensuring constitutional rights 
and freedoms for the bene t and protection of all citizens. 
It is multifaceted, because layered over this core of responsibilities 
are the obligations and expectations placed on a judge regarding the 
manner in which she carries out those responsibilities. This includes 
the obligations of a judge to be impartial, objective, independent, and 
fair, and the expectations that a judge should at all times be empathetic, 
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compassionate, unbiased and open-minded. Ultimately, I believe that 
this complex and multifaceted role can be reduced to a single word: 
courageous. 
[…] 45
Answers like this prove that it is possible to convey deep insight into the 
judicial role without exceeding 750 words. No reasonably informed person 
who reads Justice Slawinsky’s application could deny that, whatever the 
questionnaire’s instructions, she has a re ned understanding of what it 
means to be a judge.46 Moreover, the minimum word count seems to have 
induced some applicants to repeat themselves, rather than offer genuinely 
new insights. For example, more than once, Justice deWit provided short 
answers, followed by discursive essays “to comply with the request that 
I answer in 750–1000 words.” 47 Ironically, even when he purported to 
comply with the range in Question 1, his answer still fell short.48 Similarly, 
Justice Gomery spent two-thirds of her 871-word response to Question 1, 
which asks applicants to describe their most signi cant contribution to 
the law and the pursuit of justice in Canada, by listing accomplishments 
that were not her most signi cant. 49 Although this proves that not all 
answers or applicants are created equally, it also suggests that it may not 
be appropriate to impose the same 750-word minimum on every question. 
A minimum word count might make sense when one asks a broad question 
on the role of a judge, but not when one asks a narrow question about a 
single individual’s past achievements. 
2. Judicial federalism invites cross-province comparisons
One might object to the above analysis because it relies in part on comparing 
judges appointed on opposite sides of the country, whose applications and 
answers would have been vetted by separate Judicial Advisory Committees 
with distinct memberships. Certainly, local culture and talent will vary, as 
will assessments of what counts as a “good” answer. Lawyers seeking 
appointment in Canada’s smallest province, Prince Edward Island (e.g. 
45. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Marilyn Slawinsky’s Questionnaire 
(31 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicemarilynslawinskysquestionnaire0.html> [perma.cc/KX6Z-XR2G] [Slawinsky’s Questionnaire].
46. Her 18 months of experience as a Provincial Court judge doubtless aided her understanding.
47. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice William T. deWit’s Questionnaire (31 
March 2017) at Questions 1 and 4, online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/
the_honourable_justicewilliamtdewitsquestionnaire0.html> [perma.cc/G4S3-ESU6] [deWit’s 
Questionnaire].
48. See Table 3.
49. See Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Sally A. Gomery’s Questionnaire (3 
November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
sallyagomerysquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/R6PC-LNJU] [Gomery’s Questionnaire].
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Clements), whose practising Bar is less than two per cent the size of British 
Columbia’s,50 do not compete with those in British Columbia (e.g. Riley). 
This might explain the difference in the quality of Justice Clements and 
Justice Riley’s answers, but it does not excuse it. To suggest that Islanders 
should have lower expectations of their judges because of the province’s 
size disrespects the people of Prince Edward Island, who are morally 
entitled to access the same quality of justice as anywhere else in Canada. 
It also offends principles of federalism. For instance, the superior trial 
courts to which Clements and Riley were appointed represent a unique 
brand of judicial federalism. These courts are “superior” in the sense that 
they possess inherent jurisdiction to hear almost any legal matter, a power 
they inherited from the common law courts of the United Kingdom before 
Confederation. While section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 preserved 
provincial power to administer and reorganize the superior courts, section 
96 assigned the power to appoint “Judges of the Superior…Courts in each 
Province” to the Governor General, acting on the advice of Cabinet.51 This 
was a centralizing feature of the new Dominion’s constitution, designed 
to install judges who would be sympathetic to the federal government’s 
policies and thereby insulated from “local politics or prejudice.”52 Although 
the federal judicial appointments process has become more responsive to 
provincial interests over time—for instance, by inviting representatives 
from the local chapter of the Canadian Bar Association and the law 
society to sit on the Judicial Advisory Committees—the federal Cabinet 
retains wide latitude in selecting candidates. If the Minister of Justice is 
truly committed to making appointments based on merit, then it is both 
reasonable and morally right that the Minister of Justice would use this 
distinct authority to assess the quality of applicants for judicial of ce in 
one part of the country by reference to applicants in another. Taking such 
an approach is not contrary to federalism, but a vindication of it.
Of course, this analysis ignores that the Judicial Advisory Committee 
might have recommended Justice Clements in part because of the 
government’s new emphasis on diversity. As a Queen’s Counsel and 
partner at a leading regional law  rm, Clements would have been widely 
considered a leader in the profession at the time of her appointment. Her 
gender would not have been the only or even the main trait to qualify her 
50. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, “Membership: Statistical Report of the Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada” (2016), online (pdf): < sc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Statistics-2016-
FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/AFX2-23LK].
51. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, s 96.
52. Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, and 
Process, 2nd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford UP, 2015) at 147-148.
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for the bench, but it would not have hurt her either. This is not to argue 
that diversity jeopardizes appointments based on merit, as some in the 
media have suggested.53 Rather, the point is that if one accepts Justice 
Clements was as quali ed a candidate as any, then one should have 
reasonably expected her to demonstrate her substantive insight into the 
role of the court at the very moment she applied to join its ranks. So far as 
her questionnaire can attest, she did not do this, which says as much about 
her as it does the Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister’s lenient 
attitude toward shortcomings in the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial 
Appointments.54
3. It pays to be humble (but it pays more to know your audience)
Federally appointed judges receive a handsome sum for their labour. As 
of 1 April 2019, a trial or appellate court justice earned a base salary of 
$329,900 annually. Chief and Associate Chief Justices earned an extra 
$31,800.55 Unlike in many civil law countries, where judges are career 
bureaucrats, becoming a superior or federal court judge in Canada is 
among the highest professional honours a lawyer can achieve. It takes 
guts and some measure of egotism for a person to think,  rst, that he is 
objectively capable of serving as a judge; second, that he deserves to be 
appointed next to the hundreds of other contenders who apply each year; 
and, third, that he is not only legally but morally quali ed to pass judgment 
on others in society.
On that basis, one might expect judicial applicants to exhibit an 
ingrained sense of superiority in their applications. In fact, the reverse 
is true. Most of the questionnaires in this study demonstrate humility on 
the part of the successful applicant before appointment. For instance, 
Justice Slawinsky attributed her good fortune in life, compared with 
those she met as a Provincial Court judge in criminal court, to “luck.”56
Justice Milman cited his “privilege” as imposing a responsibility to give 
53. See Sean Fine, “Liberals not always appointing ‘highly recommended’ judges,” The Globe and 
Mail (30 October 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberal-government-not-
always-appointing-top-recommendedjudges/article36766108> [perma.cc/GEQ9-SWSZ]. Cf Anna 
Wong, “Dismantling the Roadblocks to Judicial Diversity,” Slaw (21 February 2017), online: <www.
slaw.ca/2017/02/21/dismantling-the-roadblocks-to-judicial-diversity> [perma.cc/AX2F-CGMK].
54. Despite my criticism of Justice Clements’ answers to the questionnaire, the Prime Minister 
tapped her to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island less than eight months 
after her initial appointment: see Canada, Of ce of the Prime Minister, News Release, “Prime Minister 
announces appointment of new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island” (27 
October 2017), online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/10/27/prime-minister-announces-appointment-
new-chief-justice-supreme-court-prince-edward> [perma.cc/8U9W-4ZUP].
55. Guide for Candidates, supra note 39 at “Remuneration.”
56. Slawinsky’s Questionnaire, supra note 45.
178 The Dalhousie Law Journal
back to the community. 57 Justice Hollins insisted that she is “just one 
person,” emphasizing the important contributions that all actors make to 
the legal system, including legal assistants.58 Justice Nakatsuru struggled 
to answer the  rst question, saying “it is not in who I am to trumpet my 
accomplishments” and that he wanted to be known as someone who 
“tried his best.”59 Justice Khullar doubted whether she had made any 
“signi cant” contribution to law or justice, despite having successfully 
intervened at the Supreme Court of Canada on behalf of clients in many 
cases, including Vriend v Alberta, which held that the omission of sexual 
orientation from provincial human rights legislation violated the Charter 
of Rights and Freedom’s equality guarantee.60 The majority even adopted 
part of her analysis in its decision.61 By the same token, Justice Paciocco, 
a proli c legal scholar whose writing transformed the law of evidence 
in Canada, tempered praise for his in uence: “Initially [my] proposals 
were met with reluctance. They all now describe the current law. I am 
not taking credit for that. Together, many jurists arrived at the same 
conclusions.”62 Whether explicitly or implicitly, each of these examples 
demonstrates a tendency of applicants in the sample to downplay their 
accomplishments or attribute them to external and systemic forces beyond 
their control. This is not altogether surprising, given anecdotal evidence 
that lawyers display high rates of impostor syndrome.63 It may also re ect 
what intelligence and maturity have shown them to be true: that one is the 
product of her cumulative experiences and is shaped and helped by those 
with whom she interacts. However, given lawyers’ privileged educational 
and socioeconomic backgrounds, it is not obvious that humility would 
 gure as palpably in the questionnaires of would-be judges as it does. 
57. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Warren B. Milman’s Questionnaire 
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
warrenbmilmansquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/TQ4F-YRSG] [Milman’s Questionnaire]. 
58. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Michele H. Hollins’s Questionnaire 
(31 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicemichelehhollinssquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/GG96-DPAK] [Hollins’s Questionnaire].
59. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Shaun S. Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire 
(11 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/05/the_honourable_
justiceshaunsnakatsurusquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/JS4X-XWMF] [Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire].
60. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Ritu Khullar’s Questionnaire 
(19 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justiceritukhullarsquestionnaire0.html> [perma.cc/7JAP-P6VS] [Khullar’s Questionnaire].
61. See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at para 157, 212 AR 237 (SCC).
62. Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29.
63. See e.g. Mark Herrmann, “Impostor Syndrome: They’ll Figure Out That You’re Not Really That 
Smart,” Above the Law (1 May 2017), online: <abovethelaw.com/2017/05/impostor-syndrome-theyll-
 gure-out-that-youre-not-really-that-smart> [perma.cc/U2LG-WBVX].
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One cannot explain this exceptionally high incidence of humility in 
the questionnaires without accounting for the possibility that applicants 
deliberately emphasize the normative traits that the government expects 
in their nominees. For instance, the Of ce of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Affairs publishes the guidelines it gives to Judicial 
Advisory Committee members online. They contain a list of 20 “personal 
characteristics,” that the government desires in a judge, including—
yes—“humility.” Others include patience, honesty, common sense, tact, 
integrity, empathy, and sensitivity to changing social values.64 One might 
have come up with a similar list of traits on his own, but the fact that the 
government discloses its interests so plainly makes the judges’ tendency 
to refer to these characteristics and the government’s decision to publish 
their applications as a gesture toward transparency less meaningful. 
This is not to suggest that the applicants who evoke humility do so 
disingenuously, but the fact that they do so in a context where the trait is 
preset as normatively valuable by the government casts a shadow on the 
signi cance of an applicant’s decision to highlight her humility at all. Put 
differently, if an applicant had to answer the questionnaire without a hint 
from the government about what it was looking for, then how she chose to 
use her limited space—what she chose to talk about or not—would disclose 
more about her character than the existing application can. That does not 
mean the questionnaire would exist in a vacuum. Applicants could still 
resort to the considerable literature on what distinguishes good judging 
from bad.65 But this would at least do more to distinguish between judges 
who formed an independent conclusion on judicial virtues and those that 
merely appealed to what the government had pre-ordained. In this way, 
releasing judges’ applications is not as meaningful of a step toward judicial 
accountability as the government would lead one to believe because the 
answers predictably, albeit imperfectly, mirror the assessment criteria that 
were already made public.
4. How law and justice develop: practice, principle, and recognition
While the questionnaires are not as meaningful as they could be, neither 
are they meaningless. Question 1 asked applicants what they would 
regard as their “most signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of 
justice in Canada.” It is fair to ask what discussing one’s accomplishments 
as a lawyer has to do with the role of the judiciary. The connection is 
64. JAC Guidelines, supra note 12 at Appendix A.
65. See e.g. Jonathan Soeharno, The Integrity of the Judge: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cornwall: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2009). Or, for a different take on the traits of a virtuous judge, see Ronald KL 
Collins & David M Skover, The Judge: 26 Machiavellian Lessons (New York: Oxford UP, 2017).
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not immediately obvious. However, what applicants see as their most 
signi cant contributions to the law and the pursuit of justice reveals two 
things about how they imagine the role of the judiciary. First, it gives 
an idea of how (i.e. by what means) they believe the law and justice are 
advanced and, second, it hints at what they view as the ends or objects 
of justice. As a result, their answers anticipate the kinds of arguments or 
litigants to which they may be more or less sympathetic in court. 
Answers in the study sample vary in accordance with the unique 
work and life experiences of the individual applicants, but they all fall 
into roughly one of three categories: practice-based, principle-based, and 
recognition-based contributions to the law and justice. Although most 
applicants listed multiple contributions that they made, many singled out 
one as their “most signi cant,” responding to the question prompt. Table 
4 attempts to classify each applicant’s most signi cant contribution, based 
on signals in the applicant’s own language, as one of three types. Where 
applicants did not distinguish between the relative signi cance of one 
or more of their contributions, their categorization re ects the dominant 
theme of their answers. 
Table 4:  Judicial Applicants’ Most Signi cant Contributions
to the Law and Justice by Dominant Type
Practice-based Principle-based Recognition-based
Clements deWit Moore 






Practice-based contributions were second-most commonly cited by 
applicants in the study sample. Applicants express their practice-based 
contributions in different ways, but they all re ect a belief that the law and 
justice are most signi cantly advanced through the day-to-day practice of 
law, no matter how small the client or how big the retainer. In this sense, 
these answers treat the ordinary as extraordinary and, in some cases, cut 
the truly extraordinary down to size. In all cases, they emphasize and exalt 
the practitioner’s problem-solving skills and client service, regardless of 
whether the lawyer earns professional recognition and praise for his work. 
For example, Justice Swartz confronts and lionizes her own averageness 
as a sole family law practitioner in Ontario:
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My most signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice in 
Canada occurs in my daily interaction with members of the public, those 
who are interacting with the justice system. There is not one isolated 
thing that I have done. I have not argued at the Supreme Court. I have 
not appealed to the Court of Appeal. I have not made the front page as 
counsel in a notorious case. I help people with dif cult problems. 66
But not all applicants who subscribe to the school of practice-based 
contributions are so con dent. Some feel a need to defend their answer, 
sensing that it might not be signi cant enough to win the approval of the 
Minister or the Judicial Advisory Committee. For instance, Justice Hollins 
admitted that she second-guessed her response: 
My most signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice in 
Canada is doing my job. That was my immediate answer on  rst seeing 
this question, followed by days of deliberation, certain that something 
more inspirational was expected. However, the more thought I have 
given to this question, the more certain I am of my original answer.
My job could be described as fairly limited in scope; I do a variety of 
civil and commercial litigation with a focus on employment law. My 
clients include mid[-] to large-size companies but are far more often 
small companies and individuals, primarily employees. Whoever or 
whatever they are, they have a problem or a question about their legal 
rights and obligations arising from a particular set of circumstances in 
which they have found themselves. Their particular facts may be similar 
but are always, inevitably, unique.67
Unlike Swartz, Hollins had no shortage of professional achievements that 
she could have cited as her most signi cant contribution, including her 
tenure as national president of the Canadian Bar Association. That she 
chose not to re ects the formative in uence of her experience in legal 
practice and the relatively equal moral value she places on all of her clients, 
who she treats as ends in themselves, echoing the best traditions of Kant. 
Justice Khullar would approve, having reduced her own most signi cant 
contribution to being a lawyer who “shows up.”68 In other words, for 
her and other practice-based contributors like her, the content and the 
consequences of a lawyer’s representation are less important to advancing 
the law and justice than the act of representation itself. According to this 
view, the fact that Justice Khullar participated in the case establishing a 
66. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Deborah Swartz’s Questionnaire 
(7 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/04/the_honourable_
justicedeborahswartzsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/U89E-LCGF] [Swartz’s Questionnaire].
67. Hollins’s Questionnaire, supra note 58.
68. Khullar’s Questionnaire, supra note 60.
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constitutional right to strike69 is as signi cant to the advancement of law 
and justice as one of Justice Swartz’s routine child custody hearings. The 
public might doubt that assessment, but the appointment of applicants who 
emphasized their practice-based contributions suggests that the Minister 
and the Judicial Advisory Committees share this respect for the virtues of 
daily practice.
To be fair, practice-, principle-, and recognition-based contributions 
are not mutually exclusive. “Doing the job” of a lawyer well necessarily 
requires acting with principle. The questionnaire of Justice deWit, a former 
criminal defence lawyer, shows how applicants straddled the line between 
a practice- and principle-based contribution. For instance, he says:
…my most signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice 
in Canada is to uphold the principles of our system on a daily basis for 
the past 20 years. […] I believe that…I have been a positive asset to the 
administration of justice by working hard to uphold the rule of law and 
the laws of the land, and that this is my greatest contribution to the law 
and the pursuit of justice.70
This answer demonstrates the link between principle and practice. 
Although deWit’s response places a greater emphasis on the laws, norms, 
and principles of the legal system, it was through his legal practice 
and teaching that he achieved that end. But whereas the practice-based 
contributors see cases and clients as ends in themselves, the principle-
based contributor sees them as serving a greater good. Justice Nakatsuru 
typi es this attitude among the applicants. For example, he writes, “My 
most signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice is not a 
single case I tried or appealed, a decision that I wrote, or a legal ability 
I may possess. Stripped to its essence, I believe it is my ardent passion 
to do what I can to remedy injustice whenever and wherever I see it.”71
In this way, principle-based contributions hold out the adherence to one 
or more moral principles—in Nakatsuru’s case, remedying injustice by 
“eschew[ing] more lucrative areas of practice” to  ght for individual 
rights—as the most important vehicle for propelling the interests of law 
and justice forward. For Justice Gomery, that means not simply serving 
clients but assuming a leadership role and doing what will have “the most 
impact on the greatest number of people.”72
69. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245.
70. deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47.
71. Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire, supra note 59.
72. Gomery’s Questionnaire, supra note 49.
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By contrast, recognition-based contributions to law and justice 
differ from both practice- and principle-based contributions in that they 
attribute the greatest signi cance to one or more of a lawyer’s speci c 
accomplishments. These include particular cases tried, clients represented, 
or jobs performed that have earned them praise from their family, friends, 
peers, or other in uential people. For example, Justice Mayer said his most 
signi cant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice was the role he 
played as the lead negotiator for the Prince Rupert Port Authority, reaching 
and then implementing impact and bene ts agreements with  ve of the six 
Tsimshian First Nations in British Columbia. 73 Similarly, Justice Brundrett 
cited his work as a Crown prosecutor on one case that was af rmed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, R v Knott,74 as his greatest contribution. He 
used Question 1 to describe the state of the law both before and after that 
case, the effect of which was to increase a judge’s  exibility to sentence 
a repeat offender to probation instead of incarceration.75 By pointing to a 
particular praiseworthy accomplishment, as opposed to a general practice 
or principle, these applicants appeal to the Minister and Judicial Advisory 
Committees’ own privilege. Although three of the seven members on each 
committee may be members of the public, the other four are representatives 
of elite organizations: the law society, the Canadian Bar Association, a 
province’s Court of Appeal, and the provincial Attorney General.76 As a 
result, the Minister and the Judicial Advisory Committees are likely to  nd 
candidates who have already achieved honours or elite status (i.e. people 
like them) more relatable and arguably better suited to the judicial role 
than those who have not. Recognition-based contributions also highlight 
the undeniable connection between the pursuit of justice and the need to 
persuade other actors in society—usually governments, judges, and other 
elites—to adopt one’s vision of the Good. Without recognition, one’s 
idea of the Good can have only a limited effect on the law, which might 
explain why recognition-based contributions were popular among judicial 
applicants in this study.
The practice, principle, and recognition distinction latent in these 
applicants’ questionnaires repeats and reinforces conventional beliefs 
73. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Andrew P. Mayer’s Questionnaire 
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
andrewpmayersquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/E9YV-G8FL] [Mayer’s Questionnaire].
74. R v Knott, 2010 BCCA 386, 291 BCAC 236, aff’d 2012 SCC 42, [2012] 2 SCR 470.
75. See Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Michael J. Brundrett’s Questionnaire 
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
michaeljbrundrettsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/LFE8-F8NG].
76. JAC Guidelines, supra note 12 at “Composition.”
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about the proper role of a judge in Canadian society. Just as stare decisis 
compels judges to follow principles set by higher courts, the primacy 
of statute over the common law usually requires judges to enforce rules 
enacted by democratically elected legislators. In this context, where 
judges often take their cues from someone else, it is logical that aspiring 
judges would tend to over-emphasize those of their contributions based 
on practice and external recognition. Law students are routinely taught 
that the “Good Judge” in a common law system is one who follows 
precedent, who knows his place in the system, who defers to Parliament 
as appropriate, who avoids developing the common law more than 
incrementally, and whose decisions are upheld on appeal. When he does 
these things, the Good Judge earns the respect of his equally conservative 
colleagues on the bench and the recognition of higher courts. Whether 
he applies constitutional, statutory, or common law norms, superior and 
federal court judges are rarely called upon to establish new principles and, 
even when they are, they can almost always be derived by reference to 
higher, subsisting morals.77 As such, most of the applicants in this study’s 
sample merely did what Good Judges are expected to do: they extolled the 
virtues of practice, following professional norms and legal rules prescribed 
by law societies and governments, and they pointed to speci c times when 
others recognized them for a job well done.
The problem with this pattern is that it betrays the essential importance 
of principle to judicial selection and decision-making. For instance, Allan 
Hutchinson argues that it is “misleading and inaccurate” to describe judges 
as umpires who apply  xed legal rules to new facts. By picking which rule 
to apply, de ning what it means, and interpreting how it is applied, judges 
are inevitably entangled in a political and contestable exercise: “law is 
politics by other means.” 78 Put differently, embracing the role of the Good 
Judge is as much a political act as  outing its precepts. So, it makes sense 
that the Minister and Judicial Advisory Committees should enquire into an 
applicant’s political ideology to help inform the judicial selection process. 
This ideological investigation does not politicize the judiciary because the 
judiciary is already inescapably political.79 Viewed through this lens, the 
Trudeau government’s commitment to appointing diverse candidates itself 
77. I use “morals” in the political sense, as synonymous with normative principles, ends, or goods. 
78. Allan Hutchinson, “Looking for the Good Judge: Merit and Ideology” in Nadia Verrelli, ed, The 
Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada’s Supreme Court (Toronto: McGill–Queen’s UP, 2013) 99 
at 103, 107. See also Lorne Sossin, “Judicial Appointment, Democratic Aspiration and the Culture of 
Accountability” (2008) 58 UNB LJ 11 at 13; Douglas E Edlin, Common Law Judging: Subjectivity, 
Impartiality and the Making of Law (Ann Arbor: U Mich Press, 2016) at 110.
79. Hutchinson, supra note 78 at 109.
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represents a progressive liberal ideology about the kinds of attributes that 
are or are not relevant to good judging and to boosting public con dence 
in the judiciary. For example, if there were a positive relationship between 
the visual representativeness (e.g. gender and racial composition) of the 
judiciary and public con dence among those under-represented groups in 
society, then one would expect public con dence in the justice system to 
be highest among whites and lowest among visible minorities. However, 
that is not the case. According to Statistics Canada, public con dence 
in the courts was highest among visible minorities and immigrants in 
2013, with 74 per cent of them reporting con dence in the justice system, 
compared to just 56 points for non-immigrants. Public con dence was also 
higher among women than men.80 This does not suggest that diversity is 
an unworthy goal. Rather, it suggests that, as a goal, it is directed to some 
political end or vision of a just society. Applicants who cited principle-
based contributions as their most signi cant gave the government some 
sense of their vision for a just society. The fact that many others did not 
demonstrates the risks inherent in role morality and leaves something to 
be desired in the design of the questionnaire if it is to be more than a 
tokenistic exercise in accountability.
5. Diversity is good (and vague)
Question 2 asks applicants to describe how their experience has provided 
them with “insight into the variety and diversity of Canadians and their 
unique perspectives.” Questions 1 and 2 are similar in that they each 
posit an unquali ed good. In Question 1, it is justice. In Question 2, 
it is diversity. Just as Question 1 left justice unde ned and open to the 
applicant’s de nition, Question 2 does not de ne what the government 
means by “diversity.” As a result, the answers re ect a broad range of 
perspectives, both on what dimensions of Canada’s diversity are relevant 
to the judicial role and how one comes to develop an appreciation of that 
diversity. Yet, again, there are recurring themes. For example, Justices Bell 
and Clements gave examples of their formal education in diversity and 
cultural competence. Justices deWit, Slawinsky, Milman, and Nakatsuru 
wrote about the diversity of their clients (rich and poor, English-speaking 
and not, etc.) and how this has given them a better appreciation of the 
different life experiences people have faced. Meanwhile, Justices Hollins 
and Pentney emphasized the diversity of other lawyers and stakeholders 
80. Adam Cotter, “Public Con dence in Canadian Institutions” (7 December 2015) at 5, online 
(pdf): Statistics Canada <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015007-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/
YUR3-B5VG]. Where public con dence falls short is among Indigenous Peoples: 15 per cent fewer 
Indigenous Peoples had con dence in the justice system than non-Indigenous Peoples.
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with whom they have worked. 81 Still others like Justice Brundrett, a former 
Crown prosecutor in Vancouver’s downtown eastside, a neighbourhood 
notorious for its crime, drugs, and poverty, pointed to the economic, social, 
racial, and linguistic diversity of their opposing parties and witnesses.82
Few pointed to their own membership in a minority group, but of those 
who did, most are white men: Justice deWit spoke about being a foreign-
speaking immigrant from Holland, Justice Milman noted his Jewish 
identity, and Justice Paciocco said he was sometimes treated “differently” 
growing up in an Italian Canadian family. Of the three visible minorities 
in the sample—Justices Khullar, Mayer, and Nakatsuru—only two spoke 
of their difference as an asset. Justice Khullar, a native-born Canadian of 
East Indian heritage, did not mention it at all in Question 2 and brought it 
up in the optional Question 6 only to dismiss it: “[M]y parents raised us to 
be ‘Canadian; full stop’. That is how I view myself.”83 
Travel was the most popular way applicants in the sample acquired 
some or all of their ideas on diversity.84 Justice Bell recounted her 
experience living and working in regions across Canada, including the 
Yukon Territory. In a somewhat bizarre aside, she expressed her regret 
at not having visited the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, vowing to 
visit both “next summer.” 85 Comments like these are problematic for two 
reasons. First, they risk treating diversity as a checklist of places to go and 
people to meet, trivializing the depth of experience that the judicial role 
requires. Second, the emphasis that applicants in this study place on travel 
is a reminder that even the poorest among them come from relatively 
privileged means. Many of the people they will be judging could not 
afford to travel as extensively as they have, and, in that sense, one might 
ask whether these judges are as diverse as the government would have one 
believe. 
Then again, many of the applicants’ answers demonstrate that one 
need not belong to a socioeconomic minority to know the importance 
81. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice William F. Pentney’s Questionnaire 
(7 December 2018), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2018/12/the-
honourablewilliam-f-pentneysquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/WSA8-56V7] [Pentney’s 
Questionnaire]. 
82. See also Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29, and Riley’s Questionnaire, supra note 44.
83. Khullar’s Questionnaire, supra note 60.
84. See e.g. Moore’s Questionnaire, supra note 42; deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47; Milman’s 
Questionnaire, supra note 57; Hollins’s Questionnaire, supra note 58; Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire, 
supra note 59; Swartz’s Questionnaire, supra note 66; Mayer’s Questionnaire, supra note 73; Pentney’s 
Questionnaire, supra note 81; Bell’s Questionnaire, infra note 85.
85. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Robyn M. Ryan Bell’s Questionnaire 
(5 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/05/the_honourable_
justicerobynmryanbellsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/FY33-VRKW] [Bell’s Questionnaire].
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of diverse perspectives. Justice Paciocco described his own insight into 
Canadians’ diversity as follows:
If you want to see diversity, go to a provincial courthouse. […] Being 
a provincial court judge is an immersion in the world of poverty, 
homelessness and mental illness. In Ottawa, it is a veritable baptism 
in the challenges faced by Aboriginals, most pervasively, Inuit people 
plagued by alcoholism and displacement, often stranded far from the 
north after having come here for medical reasons. I see these people 
in their worst moments, sometimes shackled, but always bowed and 
humiliated and hurting. Often sick, always in need. It is impossible not 
to be affected by this. One would have to be blind not to see the diversity 
of our communities, and heartless not to crave solutions to inequality 
and excessive use of the criminal law. And one would have to be obtuse 
to believe we are all equally responsible for who we are, or to fail to 
recognize that justice means different things to different people—that 
the power of the law has to be wielded differently, for different people.86
One would have to be mindless not to recognize that these words 
demonstrate insight into the judicial role. Justice Paciocco powerfully 
conveys empathy toward Indigenous peoples and a certain conviction that 
the situation they  nd themselves in is morally indefensible. Examples 
like this are poignant proof that releasing the questionnaires of federal 
appointees can in fact boost the con dence in the judiciary of those who 
read them. 
Yet, consistent with the theme that not all answers are created equally, 
a few applicants made bald assertions that do nothing to demonstrate 
insight or to improve public con dence. For example, in her otherwise 
unimpeachable application, Justice Slawinsky claims that she has “no 
biases of which [she] is aware.”87 Justice deWit similarly suggests he is 
“open minded and not prejudiced towards anyone based on race, culture, 
sexual orientation or gender.”88 The problem with these statements is that 
all humans, including judges, have biases and prejudices. That an applicant 
is not aware of them makes them more, not less, pernicious. By listing four 
grounds on which he claims no prejudice, deWit invites the reader to imagine 
all the other grounds on which he might consciously or unconsciously be 
prejudiced. Thus, so long as these questionnaires continue to be released, 
applicants should take greater care to avoid unfortunate remarks that could 
lead to public embarrassment or misunderstanding. The misadventures of 
Justice Eidsvik make this much plain.
86. Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29.
87. Slawinsky’s Questionnaire, supra note 45.
88. deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47.
188 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The net result of the responses to Question 2 is to give the reader 
con dence that the appointees in the sample generally value diverse 
perspectives. However, the appointees are decidedly non-diverse in their 
shared celebration of diversity. This lack of ideological diversity is to 
be expected for four reasons. First, as discussed, applicants will appeal 
to the government’s political values to curry favour with the decision-
makers responsible for their appointment. Second, the Minister and the 
Judicial Advisory Committees will generally prefer to appoint judges who 
share the government’s political values than those who do not. Third, a 
lawyer’s training inculcates applicants with certain values and views that 
reinforce existing institutional arrangements, producing professionals with 
relatively homogenous worldviews.89 Fourth, the concept of diversity is so 
vague as to be virtually unassailable. It can mean whatever the applicant 
wants it to mean. For example, Sonia Lawrence ridicules a “diverse” 
bench as unworkable, preferring to endorse the idea of a bench that re ects 
the community it serves.90 The answers to the Questionnaire for Federal 
Judicial Appointments go to prove Lawrence’s intuition: even though 
13 of the 16 judges in this study  t the mould of the “white judge,” and 
seven are white men, no charitable interpretation of their questionnaires 
could lead one to conclude that they lack diversity. On the contrary, their 
responses demonstrate a diversity of life experience and encounters with 
perspectives unlike their own, both when one views their questionnaires 
in comparison and in isolation. Therefore, ironically, the  ercest argument 
against the need for more visible diversity on the bench could come from 
the Liberal government’s own publication of appointees’ answers to the 
Questionnaire.
6. A reasonable apprehension of “bees”?
Lastly, publishing successful judges’ applications raises a serious question 
about whether their comments could create a reasonable apprehension of 
bias and thereby undermine judicial independence. For instance, Justice 
Swartz described how an excursion to Nicaragua to take a beekeeping 
course exposed her to diverse perspectives:
As a farmer and beekeeper from so far away, it was uplifting and 
empowering to engage with a group of people so focused on developing 
a community unaffected by geography, gender or ethnicity and connected 
by our common passion. Our group was a global community. We spoke 
three different languages, came from many different countries, were 
89. Sonia Lawrence, “Re ections on Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam M Dodek & 
Lorne Sossin, eds, Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 202.
90. Ibid.
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different genders and were aged from 18 to 60. Many questions were 
asked about Canada’s system of government and justice. Questions 
about the challenges faced by our First Nations people and why Canada 
has been slow to open and maintain effective dialogue, in particular 
around environmental and land rights, were dif cult to explain. Our lack 
of clean drinking water in First Nations communities was something that 
I discussed with great shame and no reasonable explanation.91
Justice Swartz’s comments are in line with the Liberal government’s 
diversity paradigm, but they also reveal an unfavourable assessment of 
Canada’s treatment of Indigenous peoples. With a growing population 
of First Nations and decades of legal developments since the formal 
recognition of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Charter, it is not 
inconceivable that Justice Swartz could one day  nd herself adjudicating a 
rights claim between First Nations and the government, or by a group asking 
the court to read a right to a healthy environment into the Charter.92 The 
ability to search for details about a judge’s life on websites like Google has 
lowered the cost for litigants to  nd potentially damaging information that 
they can use to shop for judges.93 Now, with the advent of posting judicial 
applications online, the government contributes to the trove of publicly 
available data about members of the bench, which could come back to bite 
them. In such cases, it is fair to ask whether exposing comments like these 
to public view could create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the right 
case and, if so, whether posting judges’ applications online today is not 
worth the risk of undermining judicial independence tomorrow. 
This is a live concern, but it is overstated. Even accepting that Justice 
Swartz has an actual bias in favour of Aboriginal or environmental 
rights claimants (and it is not clear she does), that does not automatically 
disqualify her from hearing a case involving such subjects. As Justice 
Cory held in R v S (RD),94 writing for the majority on this point:
The requirement for neutrality does not require judges to discount the 
very life experiences that may so well qualify them to preside over 
disputes. It has been observed that the duty to be impartial
does not mean that a judge does not, or cannot bring to the bench 
many existing sympathies, antipathies or attitudes. There is no 
91. Swartz’s Questionnaire, supra note 66 [emphasis added].
92. See e.g. Kimberly Shearon & Margot Venton, “The Right to a Healthy Environment: Canada’s 
Time to Act” (2015), online (pdf): Ecojustice <ecojustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Right_
to_a_healthy_environment_FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/F679-AR97].
93. Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and Practice (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2012) at 75.
94. R v S (RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484, 161 NSR (2d) 241 (SCC).
190 The Dalhousie Law Journal
human being who is not the product of every social experience, 
every process of education, and every human contact with those 
with whom we share the planet. Indeed, even if it were possible, 
a judge free of this heritage of past experience would probably 
lack the very qualities of humanity required of a judge. Rather, 
the wisdom required of a judge is to recognize, consciously 
allow for, and perhaps to question, all the baggage of past 
attitudes and sympathies that fellow citizens are free to carry, 
untested, to the grave.
True impartiality does not require that the judge have no 
sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless 
be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with 
an open mind.95
In that case, the court held that a black judge was entitled to take her 
own life experience into account in concluding that a white police of cer 
probably overreacted in his aggressive treatment of a black teen. That 
she did so would not have led “an informed person, viewing the matter 
realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—” 
to conclude the judge would not decide fairly.96 Thus, the burden to 
establish a reasonable apprehension of bias is high.97 The mere fact that 
Justice Swartz is sympathetic to the plight of Indigenous peoples does 
not necessarily preclude her from fairly adjudicating a case involving 
Aboriginal claims. It is always possible to imagine a hypothetical scenario 
in which comments in one context could take on new meaning in another. 
But, now that the government has set a precedent for releasing them, 
blocking the publication of judicial appointees’ questionnaires would do 
more to undermine public con dence in the judiciary today than would 
some speculative allegation of bias in the future.
III. On transparency and priorities
Whatever the utility of publishing the applications of federally appointed 
judges, the government’s delay in releasing the excerpts to the public 
raises doubt about the strength if not the sincerity of the government’s 
commitment to accountability and transparency in judicial selection. In 
his 2015 mandate letter to the Minister of Justice, Jody Wilson-Raybould, 
Trudeau characterized openness as a top priority for his government: 
95. Ibid at para 119.
96. Ibid at para 111.
97. See also Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (AG), 2015 SCC 25 at 
paras 26, 30-34, 55, 61, [2015] 2 SCR 282.
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It is time to shine more light on government to ensure it remains focused 
on the people it serves. Government and its information should be open 
by default. If we want Canadians to trust their government, we need a 
government that trusts Canadians. It is important that we acknowledge 
mistakes when we make them. Canadians do not expect us to be perfect—
they expect us to be honest, open, and sincere in our efforts to serve the 
public interest.
[…]
You are expected to do your part to ful ll our government’s commitment 
to transparent, merit-based appointments, to help ensure gender parity 
and that Indigenous Canadians and minority groups are better re ected 
in positions of leadership. 98
That Trudeau published this letter at all—a  rst for any prime minister—
seemed to signal a genuine willingness to govern differently than his 
predecessors. Yet, despite repeated promises by the government that 
excerpts from each judicial application “will be available shortly,” the 
vast majority remain unpublished. The government undertook to publish 
excerpts for 89 of its 100 judicial appointments in 2017, but as of 1 January 
2020, it still had not published excerpts for 73 of them.
Figure 1: Length of delay between a judge’s appointment 
to the bench and publication of his or her questionnaire 
(in number of days)
98. Letter from Justin Trudeau to Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould (2 November 2015), 
online: Of ce of the Prime Minister <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-justice-and-attorney-general-canada-
mandate-letter> [perma.cc/F4EY-X8WR] [Mandate Letter].
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What is worse is that the time between a candidate’s appointment and 
the release of his application has increased drastically with successive 
nominations. Figure 1 illustrates the number of days it took the government 
to publish a judge’s application for the 16 justices appointed in 2017 
whose questionnaires are available, in order of their appointment. Note 
how the  rst ten questionnaires were all released within one month of their 
respondents’ appointments. Three were released on the same day and another 
four were published within one week. By contrast, the six applications 
published most recently were delayed by 4 to 18 months each. As of 
1 January 2020, British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice John Hunter had 
the longest outstanding questionnaire; he was appointed 994 days earlier 
on 12 April 2017. Applications for the last judges named to the bench in 
2017, a spate of eight appointed on 19 December, were 743 days past due. 
Given the government’s interest in administrative expediency and the dire 
need to  ll judicial vacancies in many parts of the country,99 it might be 
unreasonable to expect applications to be released concurrently with all 
candidates’ appointments; however, it is disingenuous for the government 
to say they will be released “shortly” when that has not been its practice in 
any meaningful sense. “Shortly” is vague, but it is not empty. A few months 
could be short; surely, two-and-a-half years is not. It is no accident that the 
 rst ten applications released by the government belong to 10 of the  rst 
12 judges to be appointed under the Liberals’ new process.100 This suggests 
that the government was eager to burnish its transparency credentials early 
on by putting its promise to publish judicial applications into practice; but, 
having already proven its readiness to release this information in principle, 
which no previous government had ever bothered to do, the government 
apparently does not see the need to follow its own precedent—at least, not 
with any sense of urgency. And therein lies the rub: because the obligation 
to release this information is political, rather than legal, the government 
may drag its feet with impunity, unless the obligation to disclose judicial 
applications is codi ed in statute.
Using access to information legislation is one option to hasten the 
records’ release, but it has not proven to be effective. For example, the 
Department of Justice found that “no records exist[ed]”101 in response to 
99. See e.g. Monique Scotti, “Alberta judicial appointments ‘imminent’ amid renewed calls to action,” 
Global News (3 April 2018), online: <globalnews.ca/news/4120154/alberta-judicial-appointments-
imminent-after-renewed-calls-to-action> [perma.cc/JF8N-SXGC]. Adding to the urgency was the 
prospect that hundreds of stale criminal charges would be stayed following the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631, which set presumptive deadlines 
for the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.
100. See Appendix A.
101. Letter from Francine Farley, Coordinator, Access to Information and Privacy Division, 
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a 13 October 2017 request that it disclose questionnaires “for all judges 
appointed by the federal government [in 2017] to the Federal Court, 
Federal Court of Appeal, all Superior Courts and Courts of Appeal of 
the provinces” under the Access to Information Act.102 This seemed to be 
a bizarre answer, given that the Department’s letter dated 8 November 
2017 came only  ve days after it had posted questionnaires for Justices 
Brundrett, Gomery, Mayer, and Milman on 3 November, as indicated by 
the timestamp on those pages of the Department’s website. However, a 
subsequent investigation by the Of ce of the Information Commissioner 
of Canada103 clari ed that the Department offers only policy analysis when 
changes are proposed to the appointment process and “does not play a direct 
role in the federal judicial appointment process,” which is coordinated 
by the Minister of Justice and the Commissioner for Federal Judicial 
Affairs.104 Conveniently, neither the Minister’s nor the Commissioner’s 
of ce is directly subject to the Access to Information Act.105 
The Commissioner’s of ce might be immune to disclosure 
requirements, but the Minister’s of ce is not. In Canada (Information 
Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence),106 an eight-
member majority of the Supreme Court held that, although a cabinet 
minister’s of ce is not “part” of the Department she manages, one may 
summon records physically held in her of ce if they are legally “under the 
control” of the Department.107 To suggest otherwise would effectively turn 
the minister’s of ce into a “black hole” for sheltering sensitive records.108
Accordingly, courts will apply a two-step test to determine whether a 
record is under a department’s control: 
•  rst, does the record relate to a “departmental matter”; and 
• second, could a senior department of cial reasonably expect to 
obtain a copy of the record upon request? 
The second step is an objective test that must consider all relevant factors, 
including “the substantive content of the record, the circumstances in 
which it was created, and the legal relationship between the government 
Department of Justice Canada to Agathon Fric (8 November 2017).
102. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1, s 4(1).
103. I  led Complaint #3217-01953 with the Commissioner on 4 January 2018 under the Access to 
Information Act, supra note 102, s 31.
104. Letter from Normand Sirois, Investigator, Of ce of the Information Commissioner of Canada to 
Agathon Fric (27 March 2018) [emphasis in original].
105. See Access to Information Act, supra note 102, s 3, “government institution,” (a) and Schedule I; 
Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 at para 
43, [2011] 2 SCR 306 [National Defence].
106. National Defence, supra note 105.
107. Ibid at paras 28, 43.
108. Ibid at para 52.
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institution and the record holder.”109 The Court emphasized that there is 
no presumption that records in a minister’s of ce are inaccessible.110 It 
follows that political records are not exempt from disclosure per se, but the 
majority seemed to accept that political records will often fall outside the 
control of the department because ministers’ of ces are not “government 
institutions” under the Act.111 Indeed, the fact a document was created by 
exempt (i.e. political) staff in a minister’s of ce and possessed solely by 
them seems to have been dispositive of the issue in that case.112 
More recently, in Yeager v Canada (Minister of Public Safety),113 the 
Federal Court rejected a researcher’s bid to obtain papers on which the 
Minister of Public Safety relied in appointing members to an independent 
review panel of Correctional Service Canada (CSC). Yeager’s mistake was 
to request the information from the Department of Public Safety, which had 
no control over CSC’s records relating to the independent panel. The Court 
reasoned that “[w]hile National Defence was concerned with whether a 
government institution has control of a record in a Minister’s of ce, the 
same logic applies in determining whether a government institution has 
control of a record in the possession of another government institution.”114
In other words, the mere fact that a minister is responsible for more than 
one government institution does not mean that the records of one are under 
the control of the other. A similar analysis would likely apply to the present 
case. The completed judicial questionnaires are not created from scratch 
by political staff, but the selection of judges is a fundamentally political 
exercise centred in the Minister’s of ce. It is not an activity that relates to 
the kind of legal or policy work that one would normally think of as being 
a “departmental matter.” This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that 
the appointment process  ows through the Of ce of the Commissioner 
for Federal Judicial Affairs, a separate, purpose-built body that Parliament 
opted not to include within the Access to Information Act’s scope. 
One could argue that the questionnaires relate to a departmental matter 
because the applications are posted on the Department’s website, rather 
than the Commissioner’s. But even if one could pass the  rst step of the 
control test, it is doubtful that a senior department of cial could reasonably 
expect to obtain a copy of an unpublished judicial questionnaire from 
the Minister or the Commissioner upon request, particularly as they are 
109. Ibid at para 56.
110. Ibid at para 57.
111. Ibid at para 58.
112. See ibid at paras 60-63.
113. Yeager v Canada (Minister of Public Safety), 2017 FC 330, 279 ACWS (3d) 228.
114. Ibid at paras 59, 61.
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under no legal obligation to make that information public. As a result, it 
is unlikely that the Access to Information Act compels the government 
to follow through on a prior commitment to publish the applications of 
federal judges.
Still, one should not have to beg or complain to access the judges’ 
applications after the government has undertaken to release them. In 
addition to reforming the judicial appointments process, Trudeau instructed 
the Minister to:
[w]ork with the President of the Treasury Board to enhance the 
openness of government, including supporting his review of the Access 
to Information Act to ensure…that the Act applies appropriately to 
the Prime Minister’s and Ministers’ Of ces, as well as administrative 
institutions that support…the courts.115
There are good reasons why it might not be “appropriate” to grant 
wholesale access to information in Ministers’ Of ces or the Of ce of 
the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Ministers are reasonably 
entitled to a zone of privacy in which they can conduct the dif cult and 
stressful business of managing the country’s affairs without fear of constant 
scrutiny. However, if the government is as committed to accountability 
and transparency in judicial appointments as it claims to be, then there is 
no reason why judges’ applications should not be subject to the Act’s right 
of access, which already contains provisions to safeguard judges’ most 
sensitive personal information.
According to the Minister’s of ce, the problem is not a question 
of commitment but of law and resources.116 David Taylor, Director of 
Communications in the Of ce of the Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General, cites two reasons for the delay. First, he says, the Privacy Act117
and the application form require the government to obtain the jurist’s 
consent before it may publish his questionnaire. Second, after the judge 
has consented to his application’s release, staff must redact personal 
information, convert  le formats, and translate the questionnaires. Taylor 
says this “labour-intensive and time-consuming” work is performed by 
115. Mandate Letter, supra note 98 [emphasis added].
116. Requests that the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, Marc Giroux, voluntarily disclose 
what the government had already publicly undertaken to publish were  rst ignored and then redirected 
to the Minister’s of ce: Letter from Agathon Fric to Marc Giroux (18 November 2017); Letter from 
Natalie Duranleau, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs to Agathon 
Fric (23 January 2018).
117. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
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only two people in the Minister’s of ce who do not receive administrative 
support from the Department of Justice.118 
Neither explanation offers a compelling reason to delay disclosure. 
First, while it is true that the application form indicates “[t]he nominee will 
be asked to consent to the release of any personal information…prior to its 
release,” the form also declares the government’s intention to make that 
information public: “if a candidate is chosen, [then]…it is intended that 
at that time the personal information, including information on diversity, 
and information contained in PARTS 6 and 7 of this Questionnaire is to 
be disclosed to the public.”119 Given the application’s express wording and 
the emphasis this government has placed on opening the selection process 
to scrutiny, one could argue that the publication of a judge’s questionnaire 
should be construed as a condition of appointment. This construction is 
supported by the government’s use of the words “at that time,” which 
implies that the government intended the information should be released 
once a candidate is selected. In this sense, it was unnecessary for the 
government to include the line promising to ask for the nominee’s consent. 
Having given clear notice to prospective applicants of the government’s 
intention to publish the questionnaire if their application succeeded, it 
is hard to imagine how a judge who accepts the appointment could then 
reasonably withhold consent. But even assuming that consent could not 
be implied, the consent issue is a red herring. By Taylor’s own admission, 
as of 25 October 2017, no judge had objected to the publication of his 
application.120 Insisting on the nominees’ consent at a later stage might 
have been a way to induce applicants to answer the questionnaire candidly 
or to encourage people to apply who otherwise might not have if they knew 
their personal information had to be published. These are valid concerns. 
But, on one hand, it is doubtful that this quali cation would change an 
applicant’s answers so signi cantly as to warrant the limitation and, on the 
other, it raises questions about the wisdom of appointing a judge who does 
not share the government’s commitment to accountability.
Moreover, it is not clear that the Privacy Act requires the Minister’s 
of ce to obtain the judges’ consent after the fact. For example, subsection 
8(1) prohibits a government institution from disclosing personal 
information without the subject’s consent. However, subsection 8(2) 
establishes a list of exceptions to the rule: 
118. Cristin Schmitz, “Liberals fail to deliver on pledge to publish excerpts ‘shortly’ from applications 
for bench,” The Lawyer’s Daily (25 October 2017), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/4993> 
[perma.cc/2RT5-MNXK].
119. Questionnaire, supra note 28 [emphasis added].
120. Schmitz, supra note 118.
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Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the 
control of a government institution may be disclosed
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or 
compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that 
purpose;
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or 
any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
[…]
The Liberals’ reformed Questionnaire serves dual purposes—one 
administrative and speci c, the other democratic and general. First, it serves 
an immediate need to help Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister 
of Justice make recommendations for appointment. Second, it enables 
scrutiny of a candidate’s suitability for judicial of ce by the Committees, 
the Minister, and Canadians more broadly. Although one could circumvent 
the Privacy Act’s protections by de ning the purpose of the data collection 
at increasing levels of generality, it is not such a stretch to suggest that 
publishing judges’ applications online to promote judicial accountability is 
“the purpose for which the information was obtained or…a use consistent 
with that purpose,” especially given the government’s express words 
on the form. Alternatively, section 8(2)(b) gives the governing Liberals 
another way to make good on their transparency promise—that is, to 
pass legislation requiring the government to release the applications of 
successful candidates, notwithstanding the individual’s consent.
Taylor’s pragmatic concerns are likewise exaggerated. If consent is 
not the big issue that he makes it out to be, then he would have one believe 
that redaction, formatting, and translation account for the delay. Certainly, 
judges will have answered the questionnaire in only one of the two of cial 
languages. Since all federal government information must be published in 
English and French, staff would need to translate the answers. However, 
staff managed to format, translate, and publish 10 of the 16 available 
questionnaires within one month of those judges’ appointments, which 
suggests that something other than formatting and translation is to blame 
for the 24- to 34-month delays facing the 73 outstanding questionnaires. 
If staff are spending that time liaising with judges to redact personal 
information or augment their initial answers, then it raises the question 
as to how committed the government can be to transparency in judicial 
appointments if it is singly or together with recent appointees cherry-
picking what parts of their answers get disclosed. Rather than remain a 
mystery, judges’ pro les would then represent carefully curated and thus 
self-serving images of the Liberals’ appointments. There is no evidence 
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that this is the case, but the idea is not as wild as it sounds. For instance, 
no rules prohibit the government from modifying the questionnaires; such 
modi cations would explain the increasingly long delays; and, when asked, 
Taylor did not answer whether judges may change their questionnaires 
before publication.121
Acknowledging the delay, Taylor offered assurances in 2018 that 
the Minister would seek “additional help from the Department of Justice 
to speed up the posting of the applications online.”122 However, as the 
foregoing discussion makes clear, the Minister’s of ce has a legal interest 
in not requesting the Department’s help so as to avoid embarrassing or 
premature disclosure under the Access to Information Act. On that basis, 
it seems unlikely the Minister ever sought additional help to pick up the 
slack. Indeed, starting on 22 June 2018, scarcely 18 months after it had 
begun the practice, the government quietly stopped promising to publish 
the judicial applications of its new appointees—“shortly” or at all.123 Of 
the 33 it did promise to release in 2018, 20 (61 per cent) had still not been 
published as of 1 January 2020.124 Excerpts were available for only one 
out of every three appointees from 2018 and zero appointees from 2019.125
Notably, this change in practice coincided with Wilson-Raybould’s exit 
from the Department of Justice on 14 January 2019.126 News releases 
announcing appointments have since tended to include more detailed 
biographies of the appointees, but they lack the same quality or quantity 
of information offered by the raw answers to the Questionnaire.
What this ultimately means is that releasing excerpts from the Liberals’ 
judicial applications is not a priority, despite the government’s rhetoric to 
the contrary. In Taylor’s words: “our priority in supporting the Minister is 
121. Ibid.
122. Letter from David Taylor, Director of Communications in the Of ce of the Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General to Agathon Fric (9 February 2018).
123. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces 
judicial appointment in the province of New Brunswick” (22 June 2018), online: <www.canada.ca/
en/department-justice/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-announces-judicial-appointment-in-the-
province-of-new-brunswick1.html> [perma.cc/9PUD-SXBF]. Despite the formal reversal, Taylor 
insisted the Department would continue to publish judges’ applications, which it did for 15 individuals 
appointed after 22 June 2018: Cristin Schmitz, “Trudeau government breaks promise to disclose info 
on new federal judges ‘shortly,’” The Lawyer’s Daily (5 July 2018), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/
articles/6882> [perma.cc/J9EM-JBDG].
124. See Appendix B.
125. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces 
judicial appointment in the province of Quebec” (31 January 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
department-justice/news/2019/01/government-of-canada-announces-judicial-appointment-in-the-
province-of-quebec.html> [perma.cc/3E5Y-LGYH].
126. Peter Zimonjic, “After being removed as justice minister, Wilson-Raybould defends her 
performance,” CBC News (14 January 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilson-raybould-
justice-veterans-1.4977782> [perma.cc/C2N5-WAE7].
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in making exceptional judicial appointments, which she has done. The team 
is making its best efforts to clear the backlog of applications.”127 Although 
making the appointments should rightly take priority over publishing their 
applications, Taylor’s defence of this lackadaisical approach invites one of 
three charges: 
i. the questionnaires do not offer much substance, so the value of 
publishing them is illusory;
ii. the questionnaires are politically bene cial but the Minister has 
neglected her undertaking to release them “shortly”; or
iii. the questionnaires are politically damaging and the Minister has 
deliberately sought to suppress them.
That the questionnaires might be of limited value is no excuse to renege on 
the government’s original promise to release them. The government loses 
credibility on the transparency issue when it permits delay to overshadow 
its pledge to open government. The message is clear: appoint  rst and 
worry about transparency later, if at all. These are not the “sunny ways” 
that Trudeau promised on the night of his election128 but politics as usual. 
If the current Minister, David Lametti, cared about his government’s 
commitment, then he would hire additional help. He would insist that 
judges’ questionnaires be displayed prominently on the Department’s 
website and not buried in a press release. Put simply, he would do things 
differently. Trudeau’s reforms toward openness will have been for naught 
if he is ousted from of ce before establishing a new norm of judicial 
accountability through the publication of federal judges’ questionnaires. 
Therefore, the government’s delay in releasing the excerpts undermines 
the Liberals’ transparency project. This suggests that there is room for 
improvement.
Recommendations and conclusion
Answers to the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments disclose 
various interests, themes, and emotions. Although applicants express 
their views of judging and justice in different ways, drawing on their own 
unique anecdotes and experiences, their answers frequently exhibit insight 
into the judicial role in Canada.
Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. As discussed, some 
candidates did not bother to comply with the government’s requested word 
range, providing short and super cial answers to otherwise compelling 
127. Letter from David Taylor, supra note 122.
128. Justin Trudeau, “For the Record: A Full Transcript of Justin Trudeau’s Speech,” Maclean’s (20 
October 2015), online: <www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/justin-trudeau-for-the-record-we-beat-
fear-with-hope> [perma.cc/ZSB2-558Y].
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questions. Many simply followed the government’s own rubric to reverse-
engineer answers based on stipulated assessment criteria. Ultimately, 
most offered responses based on common assumptions of what “Good 
Judges” are supposed to do. Together, these observations suggest that 
some candidates were better quali ed for judicial appointment based on 
their written answers than others. This does not mean the others were 
unquali ed—only that their applications were demonstrably weaker in 
relative terms. This signi es that, as currently constituted, the Questionnaire 
mostly serves as a test of conventional judicial attitudes and government 
politics than as an inventory of genuinely free ideas. To that extent, its 
utility as a meaningful tool for judicial accountability is suspect.
But not all hope is lost. If the federal government takes its commitment 
to transparency and accountability in judicial appointments seriously—
and it should—then there are speci c, measurable steps it could take 
immediately to improve the quality and signi cance of applicants’ answers: 
a. Eliminate (minimum) word counts. Applying for federal judicial 
of ce is a serious undertaking. It should not be taken lightly. 
Although a longer answer will not always be superior to a 
shorter one, removing word counts will give applicants an early 
opportunity to demonstrate good judgment in gauging the level 
of depth that a particular question warrants. If the government 
retains word counts—for instance, to promote equity between 
applications—then the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs 
should request applicants who do not comply with the rule to 
resubmit their questionnaires.
b. Ask at least one value-based question to probe a candidate’s 
political (not partisan) ideology. Because the Minister’s judicial 
appointments are inescapably political, ideology is a proper 
consideration in selecting nominees for the bench. When 
applicants say they support values like diversity, one should have 
con dence that they mean it. Including a question designed to tease 
out an applicant’s normative value preferences, rather than the 
government’s, will improve the quality of information available 
to Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister. To avoid the 
risk that the applicant will uncritically adopt the government’s 
position, any such question should not be one that is readily 
identi able with the political Left or Right. Instead, it should 
let applicants express a value preference on an issue that de es 
traditional partisan divides. For instance, the Questionnaire might 
ask: should Canada ban the exchange of cryptocurrencies (such 
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as Bitcoin)? Should governments develop arti cial intelligence 
programs to defend litigants who cannot afford a lawyer? Or, is 
it more important for children to learn obedience or creativity?129
Such questions would reveal something about a judge’s beliefs 
without providing an obvious cue or creating an expectation about 
the “appropriate” answer. They also have two added bene ts. First, 
they show how the applicant might approach a novel problem on 
the bench, including the number, nature, quality, and diversity of 
authorities upon which the applicant relies. Second, they compel 
the applicant to educate herself and then speak intelligently on a 
subject about which she may not have prior knowledge. As most 
federally appointed judges serve on a bench of generalists who are 
expected to settle a wide range of disputes—civil and criminal, 
private and public—it is  tting that they should answer such 
questions, no matter how esoteric they may seem.
c. Pass legislation to codify the government’s commitment to 
disclosure. A statute codifying the Department of Justice’s 
promise to release successful applicants’ questionnaires would 
obviate the need for individual consent, prevent future backlogs, 
and make it clear that consent to disclose the questionnaire is a 
condition of federal judicial appointment. To avoid a constitutional 
challenge, the statute should make it clear that the Act does not 
alter the Governor General’s prerogative to appoint any person 
to the judiciary. A statute of this nature would be analogous to 
Canada’s  xed election date law.130 Legislation would have the 
added bene t of binding future governments to this practice, of 
imposing legal time limits for disclosing the information, and of 
normalizing the application process as a whole.
d. Improve the online visibility and accessibility of the questionnaires. 
The Department of Justice should abandon technical transparency 
and embrace enthusiastic compliance. That means not only 
releasing the questionnaires promptly, but also promoting them 
on the Department’s website as an educational resource. Answers 
should be assembled in one place and featured prominently instead 
of hyperlinked from an old press release.
129. These questions represent future controversies that are not popularly associated with a particular 
political party. See Table S2, Supplementary Materials in Michael Macy et al, “Opinion Cascades and 
the Unpredictability of Partisan Polarization” (2019) 5:8 Sci Adv eaax0754.
130. An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, SC 2007, c 10.
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Some will argue that the observations in this article harm the 
reputations of the judges mentioned in it. They will suggest that this essay 
undermines public con dence in the judiciary. However, this criticism is 
unfounded for three reasons. First, it overestimates the probable impact of 
one law review article on the public’s con dence in the judiciary. Second, 
it ignores the diamonds in the rough—the gems that should give us all 
con dence in the decision-makers whom we have empowered to regulate 
human affairs. Third, it denies the government’s agency in choosing to 
publish this content and the judges’ own role in consenting to its release. 
In a democratic society, citizens expect their institutions to be transparent 
and accountable to them. Publishing judicial applications is an expression 
of those values. If this article does real harm, then it is more an indictment 
of the government’s decision to publish these questionnaires than it is a 
comment on the wisdom of dissecting them.
This raises a second objection, which is that this article might 
frighten the government away from its transparency initiative altogether 
or discourage applicants for judicial of ce from being candid in their 
answers. This too is a misleading objection for two reasons. First, as the 
analysis above illustrates, the government has already shown itself to be 
less than committed to its transparency promise. Second, if a study such as 
this undermines the quality of judicial applicants or their applications, then 
the blame lies squarely at the government’s feet. Surely, the government 
did not undertake to publish judges’ answers thoughtlessly. The Minister 
of Justice must have concluded that more con dence would come from 
their publication than from their concealment. That was a judgment call 
the Minister was entitled to make. If she was wrong about it, then she 
bears responsibility for that decision. It was reasonably foreseeable that a 
novel treatment of these questionnaires would attract public comment. If 
the Minister failed to anticipate that, then she was reckless as to whether 
their publication might limit their utility in the hiring process.
The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments is a gift that 
keeps on giving. Judicial diversity, independence, impartiality, and 
politics—the Questionnaire implicates them all and makes it possible to 
understand the relationship between the judge and the judged in ways that 
were unimaginable less than two years ago. This study has only scratched 
the surface of possible inquiries. The sheer volume of new material 
makes it ripe for analysis. Examining the answers to Questions 3 to 6 and 
comparing the answers of judicial appointees in 2017 with those in 2018 
are the next logical steps. Before judges’ applications became public, one 
had to guess who comprised Canada’s judiciary. The beauty of publishing 
responses to the Questionnaire is that,  nally, Canadians can stop to guess 
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and begin to know. At last, they can interrogate their con dence in the 
people they empower to settle disputes among them and in the processes 
by which they put them there. But they cannot play this game alone. For 
that, they will need a government willing to  nish what it started. Only 
then can Canadians win.
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APPENDIX A
All federal judges appointed from 1 January to 31 December 2017 
whose application questionnaires the Department of Justice has publicly 
undertaken to publish in part
Listed in order of appointment:




3/9 PEI Clements, Tracey L. (Q.C.) Trial 3/9/2017
3/24 AB deWit, William T. (Q.C.) Trial 3/31/2017
3/24 AB Hollins, Michele H. (Q.C.) Trial 3/31/2017
3/24 AB Khullar, Ritu (Q.C.) Trial 4/19/2017
3/24 AB Slawinsky, The Honourable Marilyn Trial 3/31/2017
3/24 QC Moore, Benoît Trial 3/31/2017
4/7 ON Paciocco, The Honourable David M. Appellate 4/7/2017
4/7 ON Swartz, Deborah Trial 4/7/2017
4/12 BC Hunter, John James Lyon Appellate
4/12 BC Mayer, Andrew Phillip Avtar Trial 11/3/2017
4/12 ON Bell, Robyn M. Ryan Trial 5/5/2017
4/12 ON Nakatsuru, The Honourable Shaun S. Trial 5/11/2017
5/4 QC Bachand, Frédéric Trial
5/4 QC Baudouin, Christine Trial
5/4 QC Rogers, Karen M. Trial
5/4 QC Royer, Daniel Trial
5/12 AB Kubik, Johnna C. Trial
5/12 BC Riley, W. Paul (Q.C.) Trial 11/1/2017
5/12 NL Chaytor, Sandra R. (Q.C.) Trial
5/12 NL Knickle, Frances J. (Q.C.) Trial
5/19 ON Audet, Julie Trial
5/19 ON Desormeau, Hélène C. Trial
5/19 ON Favreau, Lise G. Trial
5/19 ON Monahan, Patrick J. Trial
5/19 ON O’Bonsawin, Michelle Trial
5/19 ON Shaw, M.J. Lucille Trial
5/19 ON Williams, Heather J. Trial
6/9 BC Branch, Ward K. (Q.C.) Trial
6/9 Federal Lafrenière, Roger R. Trial
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6/9 NL O’Brien, Francis P. Appellate
6/9 ON Hurley, Patrick Trial
6/9 QC Quach, Aline U.K. Trial
6/14 BC Forth, Carla L. (Q.C.) Trial
6/14 BC Iyer, Nitya (Q.C.) Trial
6/14 BC Milman, Warren B. Trial 11/3/2017
6/14 BC Tammen, Michael (Q.C.) Trial
6/14 ON de Sa, Chris Trial
6/23 AB Ashcroft, Janice R. (Q.C.) Trial
6/23 BC Brundrett, Michael J. Trial 11/3/2017
6/23 BC Marchand, The Honourable Leonard (Jr.) Trial
6/23 BC Shergill, Palbinder Kaur (Q.C.) Trial
6/23 Federal Laskin, John B. Appellate
6/23 Federal Pentney, William F. (Q.C.) Trial 12/7/2018
6/23 ON Gomery, Sally A. Trial 11/3/2017
6/23 ON Koehnen, Markus Trial
6/23 ON Petersen, Cynthia Trial
6/23 ON Schreck, The Honourable P. Andras Trial
6/23 ON Summers, Darlene L. Trial
6/23 QC Kalichman, Peter Trial
6/23 QC Vincent, Marie-France Trial
7/18 NS Brothers, Christa Trial
7/18 NS Derrick, The Honourable Anne Appellate
7/18 NS Murray, Cindy Trial
7/18 ON Fairburn, The Honourable J. Michal Appellate131
7/18 ON McArthur, The Honourable Heather Trial
7/18 ON San lippo, Andrew A. Trial
131. Madam Justice Fairburn is notable because the government pledged to release her application 
even though she was already a sitting trial judge at the time of her elevation to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. The government likely erred in undertaking to produce her application—e.g. the result 
of copying and pasting an old news release—given that the announcements of such promotions 
do not generally refer to the existence of an application. See e.g. the news release announcing the 
appointment of Justice Claudine Roy to the Quebec Court of Appeal: Canada, Department of Justice, 
News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial appointments in the province of Quebec” 
(17 August 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/08/government_of_
canadaannouncesjudicialappointmentsintheprovinceof.html> [perma.cc/3B25-8BZW].
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7/18 ON Speyer, Jocelyn Trial
7/18 QC Gagnon, Marie-Paule Trial
7/18 QC Longpré, Mario Trial
8/17 BC Winteringham, Janet (Q.C.) Trial
8/17 ON Harris, David E. Trial
8/17 QC Moore, Gregory Trial
9/15 Federal Ahmed, Shirzad S. Trial
9/29 AB Mandziuk, Steven N. (Q.C.) Trial
9/29 BC E. David Crossin, Q.C. Trial
9/29 ON Dietrich, Bernadette Trial
10/20 NB Daigle, Chantal N. Trial
10/20 NL Khaladkar, Vikas Trial
10/20 ON Bawden, Peter G. Trial
10/20 ON MacPherson, George A. Trial
10/20 QC Dadour, François Trial
10/27 ON Kurz, The Honourable Marvin Trial
10/27 PEI Gormley, James W. (Q.C.) Trial
10/27 PEI MacPherson, Terri A. (Q.C.) Trial
10/27 QC Lachance, The Honourable Myriam Trial
11/9 Federal Grammond, Sébastien Trial
11/9 NL MacDonald, Alexander (Q.C.) Trial
11/29 Federal Favel, Paul (Q.C.) Trial
11/29 QC Breton, Isabelle Trial
11/29 QC Thibault, The Honourable Carl Trial
11/29 SK Leurer, Robert (Q.C.) Trial
12/19 AB Dunlop, Grant S. (Q.C.) Trial
12/19 AB Lema, Michael J. Trial
12/19 BC Marzari, Francesca Trial
12/19 MB Abel, Scott D. Trial
12/19 ON Copeland, The Honourable Jill M. Trial
12/19 ON London-Weinstein, Anne Trial
12/19 ON McArthur, The Honourable Michael D. Trial
12/19 QC Brodeur, Johanne (Ad.E.) Trial
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APPENDIX B
All federal judges appointed from 1 January to 21 June 2018 
whose application questionnaires the Department of Justice has publicly 
undertaken to publish in part132
Listed in order of appointment:




1/19 ON Nishikawa, Sandra Trial
1/19 QC Nolin, Pascale Trial
1/19 BC Basran, Jasvinder S. (Bill) Trial 3/26/2019
2/7 BC MacDonald, Diane Trial 3/25/2019
2/22 SK MacMillan-Brown, Heather (Q.C.) Trial
2/22 SK McCreary, Meghan (Q.C.) Trial
2/22 ON Leef, Karen D.M. Trial
2/22 AB Burns, Marta E. Trial
2/22 BC Norell, Barbara J. (Q.C.) Trial 4/13/2018
2/22 BC Baker, Wendy (Q.C.) Trial 1/25/2019
2/22 BC Matthews, Sharon (Q.C.) Trial 3/26/2019
2/26 Federal Walker, Elizabeth Trial
2/26 Federal Norris, John Trial
3/15 YT Campbell, Edith M. Trial
4/4 QC Platts, David E. Trial
4/4 QC Frappier, Jérôme Trial
4/4 MB Champagne, R. Kenneth Trial 11/23/2018
4/4 AB Ho, L. Bernette Trial 12/13/2018
4/12 AB Bobb, Gaylene Trial
5/1 AB Labrenz, David (Q.C.) Trial 6/8/2018
5/4 AB Neilson, James T. (Q.C.) Trial
5/4 AB Dilts, Nancy (Q.C.) Trial 7/11/2018
5/4 AB Kirker, Anne (Q.C.) Trial 11/13/2018
5/4 AB Fagnan, Jane A. Trial
5/4 AB Grosse, April D. Trial 7/11/2018
132. This list excludes Thomas J. Crabtree who was appointed to the British Columbia Supreme 
Court on 4 May 2018. Although the government had pledged to release the questionnaires of those 
it appointed before 22 June 2018, the press release announcing Justice Crabtree’s appointment, last 
modi ed on 29 August 2018, makes no such promise.
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5/11 SK Zerr, Krista L.133 Trial
5/24 ON Champagne, Nathalie Trial
5/24 ON MacEachern, Pamela Trial
5/24 ON Nieckarz, Tracey J. Trial
6/7 Tax Court Monaghan, K.A. Siobhan Trial
6/7 Tax Court Wong, Susan Trial 8/1/2018
6/15 NB Robichaud, Ivan (Q.C.) Trial
6/15 BC Gomery, Geoffrey B. (Q.C.)134 Trial 2/6/2019
133. The press release announcing Justice Zerr’s appointment purports to disclose her questionnaire; 
however, the link is broken. A search of the Department’s website yields no results.
134. The link to Justice Geoffrey Gomery’s questionnaire is broken, but it is accessible by searching 
the Department’s website.
